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ABSTRACT 
FUNDAMENTALIST RELIGIOUS MOVEMENTS: A CASE STUDY OF THE 
MAITATSINE MOVEMENT IN NIGERIA 
Katarzyna Z. Skuratowicz 
Apri120,2004 
This study is a historical analysis of reasons and dynamics behind the emergence 
of fundamentalist religious movements. Its purpose is to develop a new conceptual 
apparatus to the approach toward religious fundamentalist movements that would analyze 
both external and internal factors influencing their emergence. It is a case study of an 
Islamic fundamentalist religious movement called Maitatsine in Nigeria. The theoretical 
background is based upon the concepts of international division of labor and the role of 
the state taken from development theories, which explain the external factors influencing 
the dynamics in West Africa, the region where the analyzed religious movement 
emerged. Analysis of the factors at the micro level is provided with the social movements 
theories' concepts of mobilization and framing, which explain the organization of 
religious movements. Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer's concept of the culture 
industry, and Antonio Gramsci' s concepts of hegemony and counter hegemony are used 
to analyze the ideological background of the fundamentalist religious movements. 
Historical context, with the history of Islam, colonialism, and post-independence period 
in Nigeria are presented in order to provide a background for the study of the Maitatsine 
movement. Findings indicate that the world dynamics significantly influence economic 
and political realities of peripheries with weak states. They provoke the increase of the 
"disinherited" social groups in the capitalist secular system, which include mainly 
immigrants, foreigners. Consequently, this inflames rising feelings of grievance toward 
the dominant western culture that is directed by charismatic religious leaders. Religious 
ideology becomes a strong mobilizing and framing factor that creates counter hegemony 
and starts controlling members adhering to the fundamentalist religious movement. 
IV 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS........................... ..................... .................... III 
ABSTRACT .............................................................. , . .. . . . ... .. .... ........ IV 
CHAPTER 
I. INTRODUCTION............................................................................. 1 
II. IMPACT OF GLOBALIZATION ON DEVELOPMENT OF PERIPHERIES...... 9 
III. MOVEMENT THEORIES, DOMINATION, AND RESISTANCE................. 24 
IV. HISTORY OF NIGERIA: ROLE OF ISLAM AND THE WEST.................... 35 
V. FUNDAMENTALIST RELIGIOUS MOVEMENTS IN NIGERIA..... .... ......... 69 
VI. CONCLUSIONS............................................................................ 92 
REFERENCES.. . . .. . .. .. .... ... .. . ... ... .... .. .. . . .. ... . . . . . . . .. . .. .. . . .. . .. . . . . .. ... ...... . .. .. . 97 




One of the main themes in the events and dynamics of late 20th and 21 5t centuries 
is the conflict between spreading processes of globalization on the one hand and the 
developing popularity of religious fundamentalism on the other. It is a conflict between 
McWorld and Jihad! as Benjamin Barber, a political scientist, names those two forces 
(Barber, 1992). Scientists view only this binary opposition in local and global relations 
that seems to be a very clear-cut differentiation without overlaps. Mc World managed to 
look seductive in a world obsessed with Jihad. The McWorld perspective claims to 
deliver peace, prosperity, and relative unity at the cost of independence, community, and 
identity (Barber, 1992). On the other side we have Jihad that delivers a different set of 
advantages: people find in fundamentalist religious movements psychological and 
material shelter, support, and a feeling of security (Hiskett 1987, Isichei 1987, 
Pilaszewicz 1995), a vibrant local identity, a sense of community, solidarity among 
kinsmen, neighbors, or countrymen. (Barber, 1992). 
Fundamentalist religious movements provide all the advantages and disadvantages 
listed above, however, not all fundamentalist religious movements have to be associated 
with Jihad and as such with Islam as it is widely perceived in today's society. The main 
characteristic of fundamentalist religious movements, whether Mormon, Catholic, 
Evangelical Christian, Muslim, Jewish is a yearning to return to the mythical order and 
I Barber treats forces of Jihad as anti-modernism cultural forces in general. 
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perfection of the original church (Krakauer, 2003: 137). One has to also know that there 
is a differentiation between fundamentalist and orthodox religious movements. As Karen 
Armstrong (2001) describes fundamentalist movements: 
[They] are embattled fonns of spirituality, which have emerged as a response to a 
perceived crisis. They are engaged in a conflict with enemies whose secularist policies 
and beliefs seem inimical to religion itself. Fundamentalists do not regard this battle as a 
conventional political struggle, but experience it as a cosmic war between the forces of 
good and evil. They fear annihilation, and try to fortify their beleaguered identity by 
means of a selective retrieval of certain doctrines and practices of the past. To avoid 
contamination, they often withdraw from mainstream society to create a counterculture; 
yet fundamentalists are not impractical dreamers. They have absorbed the pragmatic 
rationalism of modernity, and, under the guidance of their charismatic leaders, they refine 
these "fundamentals" so as to create an ideology that provides the faithful with a plan of 
action. Eventually they fight back and attempt to resacralize an increasingly skeptical 
world (2001: 2). 
On the other hand, even though orthodox religious movements have very strong 
religious rules, they do not argue for the change of the secular system, and chose to 
operate within the confines of the system. 
We know now that religious fundamentalist movements exist not only in Islam 
and that they are a very unique form of religious movements. However, when one wants 
to understand the reasons and dynamics behind the emergence of fundamentalist religious 
movements by looking at the literature in social sciences about them, it become obvious 
that the analyses are incomplete. There are several approaches toward religious 
fundamentalist movements but they all have single focus: some approaches acknowledge 
only economic and political influences on the movements (Hiskett, 1987; Isichei, 1987; 
Pilaszewicz) and some acknowledge only the internal factors treating religious 
movements only as social movements (Smith, 1996; Williams 1994). However, 
fundamentalist religious movements are neither isolated, independent responses to 
economic, social, or political conditions, nor a response only to micro-level dynamics. 
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Everything is interrelated and connected. Those separate analyzes are necessary but they 
are not sufficient to exhaustively understand the phenomenon of such popularity of 
fundamentalist religious movements. 
The theoretical approach to fundamentalist religious movements presented in this 
thesis will differ from the single focus approaches, as it will analyze both external 
(global) and internal (local) factors influencing the emergence of fundamentalist religious 
movements. The goal is to avoid oversimplifications that cannot lead toward valid and 
complete explanations of heterogeneous nature and outcome of fundamentalist religious 
movements as they emerge from different macro and micro structural and historical 
context and dynamics. The question of this thesis is to ask what factors provoke the 
emergence, reinforcement or weakening of precisely religious fundamentalist movements 
and how do they function? In consequence, the purpose of this thesis is to introduce and 
defend a new conceptual apparatus to the approach toward religious fundamentalist 
religious movements. It will constitute a method of analysis that represents an alternative 
to the modes of explanations used by currently prevailing theories. 
Given the fact that religious movements emerge in many regions of the world, 
analyzing all the Islamic fundamentalist movements of the world would be quite 
superficial. Also, one has to remember that even though there are similarities and patterns 
in fundamentalist religious movements, each one of them is influenced by its very unique 
location, history, ethnic composition, and variations in the ideology. This is the reason 
why this work will focus on the case of Nigeria and precisely on one of the Islamic 
fundamentalist religious movements called Maitatsine that emerged in Nigeria. Even 
though this thesis is a case study, it is not concerned with narrating the fundamentalist 
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religious movement of Maitatsine, but primarily with understanding and explaining the 
generalizable logic of the dynamics of the movement. 
In order to facilitate the subsequent presentation of this alternative theoretical 
approach it will be helpful to identify major types of social scientific theories used in the 
analysis of religious fundamentalist movements. Chapter two will elaborate on 
development theories, from which several concepts will be pulled out in order to 
contribute to the theoretical approach developed in this thesis. Discussion will center on 
the concepts of the international division of labor and the role of the state drawn from 
world system and dependency theories. These will be used to analyze the external 
economic and political factors playing an important role in the emergence of Islamic 
fundamentalist religious movements in the neocolonial era. Finally, the conception of 
relative role of change in the system of dependency of the two theories will be discussed. 
However, development theories' approach focuses on external influences that, 
even though is essential for the understanding of Islamic movements nevertheless it is not 
sufficient. There is a need for showing internal dynamics as well. In chapter three, the 
theoretical approach will be expanded by other concepts from theories analyzing internal 
dynamics such as framing and mobilization concepts from the resource mobilization 
theory. Additionally, Theodor Adorno's (1998, 2002b) culture industry theory will be 
used in order to show Western cultural domination of the peripheries. Antonio Gramsci's 
(2000) concept of hegemony and counter hegemony will be incorporated into the 
theoretical approach showing the possibility of change under the new emerging religious 
ideology being a new hegemony. 
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Social movements theories will be used in our theoretical approach, as religious 
movements are also social movements. Tarrow (1995) describes social movements as 
"collective challenges by people with common purposes and solidarity in sustained 
interaction with elites, opponents and authorities." Religion is a difficult term to specify. 
Common use of this term refers to a theistic religion, however there are billions who 
practice a religion, live in solidarity with each other and with nature but the concept god 
is absent. Religion is a situation where people assign to a god or to a devil their own 
power for creating or destroying. Many theorists wrote extensively about the power of 
religion and the great changes religion has undergone as societies have evolved. 
Durkheim defined religion as a "social institution involving beliefs and practices based 
upon a conception of the sacred" (Durkheim 1978). Additionally, there is a need to point 
out the uniqueness of religion in African reality, where religion, more than anything else 
influences the understanding and empirical experiences of the surrounding world. African 
traditional societies interpret current and past events through the prism of religion and it 
is religion that provides for its followers stability and identity (Mbiti, 1980: 324). This 
fact provides a more fertile ground for fundamentalist Islamic religious movement in 
African countries. The thesis will argue that fundamentalist religious movements are 
social movements where the agency and identity are strongly related to religious 
ideology. Additionally, as revolutionary movements2, fundamentalist religious 
movements are bound strongly together by the common feeling of injustice, or grievance 
caused by economic and political factors. Grievance and the feeling of injustice are ones 
of the fundamentalist components of social movements. 
2 Revolutionary movements aim at the general restructuring the system of the society. Different kinds of 
movements are elaborated in chapter III. 
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In religious movements, this solidarity and common purpose, as well as the 
framing process are set and led, in most of the cases, by the leaders of these movements. 
They create a point of reference for their disciples who were often people without any 
chance of success in life, and without any material property. They often provide them 
with food, shelter, and psychological support. However, social movements theories 
cannot provide the tools for a complete analysis of fundamentalist religious movements 
because they cannot explain external reasons for their emergence. This is the reason why 
development theories will be used in order to explain those external influences. In this 
thesis, it is also argued that fundamentalist religious movements are a counter hegemony 
to hegemony of Western domination. 
As this thesis is a case study, chapter four will discuss the historical and 
geopolitical context and conditions for the emergence of the fundamentalist movement in 
question. It will include the history of Nigeria stressing the importance of Islamic 
relations in the region of West Africa, history of colonialism with its policies and 
economic situation after the independence in the 1960s, including oil boom, oil busts, and 
Structural Adjustment Programs. 
Finally, chapter five will present the actual analysis of the Islamic fundamentalist 
religious movement called Maitatsine that emerged in Nigeria. The reason why I chose 
Nigeria is that it is a country where political, economic, and social dynamics and history 
show the significance of the process of globalization and at the same time, a country 
where the importance and presence of Islam is significant. The presence of both systems 
and ideologies makes this country a perfect case study to analyze the Islamic religious 
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movements. Nigeria is the most populous country in Africa (13 7 million people\ In 
addition, it is one of the most influential countries in West Africa, both politically and 
economically. It is also one of the biggest producers and exporters of oil in the world. 
The thesis focuses on a case study of the Maitatsine religious movement because it 
was and is a movement that was created during a very unique period for Nigeria 
illustrating the external and internal dynamics influencing the emergence of 
fundamentalisms. It was a period of oil boom in 1970s and then bust in 1980s. The 
followers of this movement were directly or indirectly connected and touched by those 
events and by the effect of spreading globalization and experiencing the effects of British 
colonialism. The movement started in Kano, in northern Nigeria by an immigrant from 
Cameroon, Muhammadu Marwa. It rejected western economic and cultural domination 
and called for return to the "true" version of Islam, which, in his understanding, was a 
complete rejection of modernism. However, Maitatsine also replaced the state in social 
support, when national social institutions were weak and hardly functioning. At first, in 
1950-60s it gathered only several disciples. It was only after several years, in 1970s, and 
several oversights of the government, the worsening of the economic situation in Nigeria, 
and many other factors (that we want to analyze closer), that this movement grew bigger 
and stronger. In 1980, it was strong enough to be able to cause riots in which more than 
10,000 people were killed, not only in one city. Those riots were spread throughout the 
entire area of northern Nigeria. (Hiskett, 1987; Isichei, 1987; Pilaszewicz 1995; 
Christelow, 1985; FaIola, 1998). 
3 Information from U.S Census Bureau http://www.census.gov/cgi-binJipc/idbsum?cty=NI 
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This research uses methods developed in historical sociology, also called analytical 
history (Singleton, Straits, 1999: 377). It will be a case study of one precise Islamic 
fundamentalist religious movement in Nigeria, called Maitatsine. Development theories, 
social movements theories, and neo-Marxists theories will provide the concepts 
employed in this research. 
The data for this thesis will come from secondary sources, which are indirect 
descriptions of primary sources. They will describe and interpret the past events in West 
Africa and then, precisely in Nigeria. In the actual analysis of the religious movement one 
primary source, which is an eyewitness account of the events described, will be used. It 
will be a testimony of a journalist who was an eyewitness during Maitatsine' s activities in 
Nigeria. A brief history of Nigeria will be presented to provide a historical context for the 
analysis. 
The historical analysis will consist of the testing of the newly created conceptual 
apparatus on one of the fundamentalist religious movements. Finally, this analysis will 
examine the social processes from which this specific movement emerged and functioned 
and will develop causal explanations of historical patterns that led to it. Those 
explanations seek for a general understanding of the social phenomena of Islamic 
fundamentalist religious movements. 
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CHAPTER II 
GLOBALIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT 
The purpose of this chapter is to develop a theoretical approach that would be 
appropriate to analyze Islamic fundamentalist religious movements. This chapter will 
focus on theories that will explain how external and internal social, economic, and 
political factors influence the emergence of those movements. This is the reason why 
concepts from world system theory and dependency theory will be used, precisely the 
concepts of the international division of labor, relationship between the core countries 
and the peripheries, which includes the importance of the role of the state. Nigeria, being 
a periphery in the world system is inclined in the relationship with a core country 
involving unequal distribution of influence and wealth. Participation in the international 
division of labor has in tum an impact on internal dynamics of a country. Finally, the 
approach toward change in those two theories will be elaborated, as fundamentalist 
religious movements are arguing for the change of the political, economic, and social 
system. 
World System Theory 
As the world entered the era of globalization, there was a need for additional tools 
for the analysis of the globalized world. Immanuel Wallerstein was the first one to show 
how to analyze the world's economic system, to take the entire world system as one unit 
of analysis. This is probably the largest unit of analysis that sociologists can take into 
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consideration. Wallerstein was a sociologist influenced by the Annales school (history 
school that used a comparative method involving long periods to examine differences and 
similarities between societies). He used a geosociological perspective in his theory, 
which means that the world history is analyzed as the development of one world system. 
By "system" it means a social entity with a single division of labor so that all the sectors 
or areas were dependent on the others via interchanges of essential goods (Wallerstein, 
1980, voLl: 7). World system theory also incorporated insights from a Neo-Marxian 
perspective by focusing on such concepts as unequal exchange, exploitation, and world-
market 1• World system theory is based upon historical methodology. Social reality is seen 
in it as part of historical cycle. It includes long-term studies and studies on large scale, 
which does not mean that world system theory analyzes only booms and busts but also all 
the dynamics of the world economy. As units of analysis it takes under consideration 
more holistic perspective, not the society itself, but the entire historical world systems. 
The International Division of Labor 
The concept of the international division of labor is the main concept that will be 
taken from the world system theory in our analysis. It is necessary in order to situate 
Nigeria in global dynamics and to show the external influences on the emergence of 
Islamic fundamentalist religious movements. The international division of labor is a 
single division of labor based upon the relationships between property and occupational 
relations. The world's upper class owns or controls the means of production. The 
working class, with no ownership, performs tasks for the owners. The distribution of 
lBesides Wallerstein, other theorists like Fernand Braudel, Albert Bergesen, or Ronald Schoenberg 
elaborated on the world system theory. However, the main reference in this theory remains with 
Wallerstein. This is the reason why we will concentrate on Wallerstein's work in the presentation of the 
world system theory and it concepts. 
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goods is based upon this division, and all the dynamics and their mechanisms try to 
maintain the dominance of the upper class (Wallerstein, 1979). 
The international division of labor is a three-tiered system (Wallerstein, 1980 
vo1.1: 349-350). The three tiers are the core countries, semiperiphery countries, and 
periphery countries. The core countries, constituting an upper class, are economically 
most diversified, wealthy and powerful both economically and militarily. They are highly 
industrialized and specialized in service industries, finances, and information 
technologies. They gain enormous profits from direct capital investments in peripheries 
and get skilled professional labor from them. They produce goods rather than raw 
materials for export what they can do without worrying for the latter because they have 
access to large quantity of raw materials and cheap labor force from the exploited 
peripheral nations. Core countries have many means of influence over noncore countries 
thanks to their position in the world and their dominance over peripheries. Nevertheless, 
the core countries themselves are relatively independent of outside control (Wallerstein, 
1980: 349). 
Peripheral nations, constituting the lower working class, are the least 
economically diversified and they are at the bottom of the world stratification system. 
They tend to depend on one type of economy, such as extracting and exporting raw 
materials to the core countries and are relatively poor economically, with less division of 
labor with high level of income inequality. They tend to have weak state institutions and 
be strongly influenced and dominated by the outside nations both economically and 
militarily. Peripheral nations are also strongly connected to the development of an 
informal economy (Wallerstein, 1980: 350). 
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Finally, semiperipheral nations, the middle class, a very important element of the 
world system, are on the path towards industrialization and a diversified economy. It is 
the sector able to profit from the "wage productivity squeeze" of the leading countries. 
Core countries exploiting the peripheral nations import all the extracted from peripheries 
resources to their markets. However, the core societies are not able to consume all the 
goods. On the other hand, products that core countries produce for export are in large part 
inadequate for the needs of periphery nations. This gap is filled by the semiperipheries. 
They import products from core countries allowing core countries to increase their profit 
and as such to keep their position of core countries in the world system. Semiperipheries 
are a "protective shield" that guards the core countries forms the rebellion of peripheral 
nations, and they are the potential "referee" during all the conflicts that may occur 
(Wallerstein, 1979a: 71-72). They are the "third party." Semiperipheries are also a point 
of reference (comparison model) for the poor nations, as an accessible model to follow, 
as they are not as much developed as the core countries and do not have as much 
influence but are higher in the world system hierarchy than peripheries. 
The Role of the State 
The role of the state is an important concept that will be used in the analysis of the 
Islamic fundamentalist religious movement as it often plays an important role in their 
emergence. Even though world system theory does not focus on the role that the state 
plays in the international division of labor, it identifies the tendencies of the weakness of 
the state in the core countries and in the peripheries. Generally, the higher the position of 
a country on the international stratification ladder is, the stronger the state institutions 
tend to be. As a result of the statement above, world system theory acknowledged that 
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core countries tend to have stronger state institutions and have less income inequality 
compared to noncore nations. Peripheries have weak state institutions and are strongly 
influenced by the outside nations (both economically and militarily). As such, they are 
subjects to the development of an informal economy. Semiperipheries are situated in the 
middle. With a weak state and its institutions there is a greater possibility for 
fundamentalist movements to emerge. 
Change in the System 
World system theory sees the position in the world system's center as a temporary 
advantage. It argues that within the global capitalist system, the developed Western 
metropolis has a temporary advantage and there is a possibility of a shift. In the future, 
the developed nations may occupy subordinate position that is currently being occupied 
by the peripheral nations. The world system is an equilibrium model, which operates 
cyclically, along the Kondratieffs cycle with A-phase (upward swing, boom, expansion) 
and B-phase (downward swing, economic contraction, bust, but also called stagnation). 
Each cycle lasts 40-55 years. There is also a period of transition during which the entire 
system (capitalist system from 16th century) will be transformed into something else, and 
the outcome is uncertain (Wallerstein, 1999: 1). The cycle also shows the possibility of 
mobility within the world system: from periphery to semiperiphery (by following certain 
strategies: seizing the chance, promotion by invitation, or self-reliance), from 
semiperiphery to core country (by economic expansion, manipulation of wages or costs 
of production), etc. However, the cycle does not make it clear how the change actually 
happen and what produces it. Also, world system theory does not acknowledge change 
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within the nations only within the entire world system. The change here is defined as 
change of positioning in the world stratification. 
World system theory can help in the analysis of the global events that occur in the 
world and as such influence the internal dynamics of the societies. However, societies are 
formed and influenced not only by world events, but also by internal relations. World 
system theory does not look and analyze internal relations and culture of the different 
parts of this world system stratification ladder, it does not show how the relations 
between the core and periphery work, and does not clarify the exact role of the state in 
these relations. This is the reason why concepts from the dependency theory are needed 
deepening the explanations of mechanisms of those relationships. 
Dependency Theory 
Dependency theory analyzes the relationship between states or multinational 
corporations and states and its mechanisms. It is still an analysis on a macro level but it is 
not as large as the world system. It focuses on the expansion and domination of 
imperialist powers that create the dependency and then underdevelopment of "Third 
World" countries. It is a binary division of labor with only two kinds of actors: core 
countries and peripheral countries. Theotonio Dos Santos formulated the definition of 
dependency as a relationship between two or more countries as follows: 
(It) assumes the form of dependence when some countries [dominant Icore/center ones] 
can expand and can be self starting, while other countries [dependent/peripheral ones] 
can do this only as a reflection of that expansion" (Dos Santos 1971 :226). 
The focus of this theory is on the structural sociological relations of the actors, 
which are the states and multinational corporations. It states that the development of a 
distinct state can only be understood by looking at its insertion into the worldwide 
economic and political system similar to the world system theory. But, it focuses on 
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consequences of capital imperialism in the "Third World" countries. Its main focus is on 
modes of production, patterns of international trade, political and economic linkages 
between elites in peripheral and core/central countries, group and class alliances in those 
countries and so on. 
Dependency is seen as a general historical process applicable to all "Third World" 
countries (general patterns of dependency seen from 16th century to the present). It is 
understood to be an external condition imposed from the outside - not a domain of 
domestic economy and policy, rather a domain of international economy, an 
international, unequal division of labor (monopolistic foreign economic policy toward 
peripheries). Dependency is analyzed mainly as an economic condition. It is a result of 
the flow of economic surplus from the "Third World" to Western capitalist countries with 
declining terms of trade of peripheries with core countries. It is a component of regional 
polarization of the global economy. Expropriation of surplus from peripheries to core 
countries leads to the underdevelopment of the first, and further development of the latter 
(Frank, 1969; Landsberg, 1979; Baran, 1957; Amin, 1976; Dos Santos, 1971). Finally 
dependency is seen as incompatible with development. The development of peripheries is 
not possible while they remain dependent upon core countries. Autonomy through a 
break in relations of dependence may not lead to development of the kind achieved in the 
developed countries of the West, but might lead to a different kind of development, 
stressing different values. Contact with the West is harmful for the periphery economy 
because it leads to the development of underdevelopment of peripheries (Frank, 1967). 
The concepts of the development of underdevelopment by Andre Gunder Frank and the 
three historical forms of dependence elaborated by Theotonio Dos Santos demonstrate 
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how the dependency is theorized to emerge and operate as the relationship between the 
core and peripheries. 
Andre Gunder Frank, the leading dependency theorist, formulated the concept of 
"development of underdevelopment." According to him, underdevelopment is not a 
natural condition but a creation of long history of colonial domination in "Third World" 
countries and that countries that became peripheries were in many cases on their own 
path of development when colonial invasion occurred (Frank, 1969). He stated that global 
capitalism destroyed or transformed earlier social systems, converting them into sources 
of its own further development. For Frank, the economic, political, social, and cultural 
institutions of the underdeveloped countries resulted from the penetration of capitalism, 
rather than being original or traditional. 
In tum, Theotonio Dos Santos distinguished three historical forms of dependence. 
First one is the colonial dependence without rigid specialization of export materials with 
monopolized control of the land, mines, social resources and the export of natural 
resources (raw materials, tropical products, etc.) from the colonized country (Dos Santos, 
1971: 226), which after the period of colonialism becomes a peripheral state. Second one 
is the financial-industrial dependence with a rigid specialization and monocultivation of 
entire regions. This form of dependency also produces in peripheral nations cheap labor 
force (skilled or unskilled) provided to the core countries. The core countries needed this 
cheap labor force during economic booms. However, during economic busts peripheries 
were absorbing unemployment from the core countries under the form of aid agencies, 
developing businesses, etc. (Dos Santos, 1971: 227). Finally, Dos Santos recognizes a 
technological-industrial dependence that emerged in post WWII period. Santos argues 
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that there are fundamentalist structural limitations placed on industrial development of 
underdeveloped economies. Industrial development is now dependent upon the existence 
of the export sector, which is part of the dual economy including exporting nations and 
importing ones. It is the only way to bring foreign currency into the state. Industrial 
development of periphery nations is strongly influenced by fluctuations of the balance of 
payments (more money leaves the country than enters) leading to their deficit. 
Additionally, highly monopolized international market tends to lower prices of raw 
materials and raise the prices for the industrial products that makes the balance of 
payment even harder for the peripheries. The result of the deficit is that foreign capital, 
and foreign aid become necessary to cover the deficit and to finance further existence of 
the country (Dos Santos, 1971: 228-230). With the entry of foreign capital, foreign 
culture enters, which deepens the process of dependency of the peripheries, adding 
cultural dependency (i.e., McDonald's, Coca-Cola, etc.). In many cases, foreign aid is 
there to "help" this kind of industrialization. It means the entry of the multinational 
corporations with the mass-culture that creates "necessary commodities" (cotton t-shirts, 
plastic buckets, European soaps etc.) that gets rid of the unique culture of peripheries and 
replaces it with uniform and standardized Western culture. 
The effects of the technological dependency for periphery nations are significant. 
An unequal capitalist development produces the polarization between "traditional" 
agrarian export sector and "modem" sector of technological, economic, and financial 
concentration (Dos Santos, 1971; Landsberg, 1979). The use of local cheap labor 
combined with capital-intensive technology creates profound differences among various 
domestic wage levels, which produce huge wealth disproportions in societies. This 
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polarization represents the dual economy within one nation, which results in demographic 
migrations from the "traditional" agrarian sector to the "modem" technological sector, 
mainly situated in the cities, what, in tum provokes a decrease of the agricultural sector 
of the peripheries. 
Frank expanded on the idea of the polarization in the dual economy with the 
concept of the relationship between satellite and metropolis. He showed how 
dependency relations work also within the peripheries themselves. Colonizers (or neo-
colonizers) implanted new cities in the "Third World" with the goal of facilitating the 
transfer of economic surplus to Western countries. Peripheral country's cities became 
satellites of metropolis situated in the West. In tum, these satellites became colonial 
metropolises (centers of trade and administration) with the respect to the provincial cities. 
The peripheries were made underdeveloped (made less developed) by the expropriation 
of their surplus product (the source of investment capital in Marxist theory), under the 
form of raw materials, minerals, commodities, profits, etc. It was a two-stage process. 
First the surplus products were expropriated to local capitals/local colonial metropolises, 
and from there, to Western countries, to core metropolis. The satellite-metropolis system 
produced even deeper underdevelopment of local satellites as it produced demographic 
migrations from local satellites to local metropolises leaving the satellites without any 
labor force and resources (most of the resources were expropriated to the metropolis), 
which was a factor increasing the disproportions inside the peripheries (Frank, 1969: 9-
12). Frank argues that this expropriation of economic surplus products has produced 
economic underdevelopment in "Third World" countries and development in Western 
countries. 
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In the division of labor there are actors that dictate or manipulate the outcomes of 
the relationship between the core and peripheral countries. One of those actors is the 
state, which has a significant influence on the intemal dynamics of the country. Both, 
world system and dependency theories were elaborating on its role. However, it is the 
dependency theory that really focused on it the most. 
Bureaucratic-authoritarian state 
The nature and role of the state is a concept that has received much focus in 
dependency theory. Femando Cardoso and Peter Evans influenced Guillermo O'Donnel 
(1978) in the creation of a new concept of the bureaucratic-authoritarian state arguing 
that under military regimes foreign investment grows and becomes so sustained that state 
institutions and national entrepreneurs no longer play a dominant role in the dynamic 
industrial sector. This concept argued that with the state being a military regimes some 
changes take place in the state that influence the relationship with the multinational 
corporations or core countries. Those changes include centralization of administration, 
repression forms of social protest, and achievement of "high degree of political 
tranquility" in the country. Bureaucratic-authoritarian state tries to accelerate economic 
growth through a combination of public and private enterprises and through "deepening 
of industrialization" that are pushed by the multinational corporations. 
The industrialization led by the military state regime is related to the concept of 
dependent development introduced by Cardoso (1973) where economic and repressive 
functions of military state play an important role in the development of the dependent 
development. Military govemrnent wiping out the union leaders (dismantling of working-
class power), and other politicians opposed to the regime provoke a "high degree of 
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political tranquility," which is good for trade conditions. Dependent development is 
related very closely to multinational corporations that are part of the neo-colonization of 
peripheries. They are interested in at least some prosperity for dependent countries 
because of the markets this prosperity would provide. Their interests coincide with 
relative economic growth at least in some sectors (industrial) of the economy. So, unlike 
the classical dependency theory assumed, dependency is not necessarily related to 
ruralization at the expense of industrialization and will not lead "Third World" countries 
to export only raw materials. However, Cardoso (1973) agreed that dependent 
development is crippled because it lacks "autonomous technolog/". The country is 
obliged to use imported technology (including standardized "cultural commodities") and 
must tolerate all the consequences of absorbing capital-intensive, labor saving-technology 
(Cardoso, 1973). Also, it is based on unequal income distribution, emphasizing luxurious 
consumer goods as opposed to basic needs, increasing foreign indebtness, contributing to 
social marginality and the under-utilization and exploitation of manpower resources - as 
a result, increasing relative misery in the country (Cardoso and Faletto, 1979). The 
periphery with a dependent development also lacks a fully developed capital goods sector 
(the middle and upper class are too little). Also, the accumulation, expansion, and self-
realization of local capital require and is dependent upon dynamics and fluctuations 
outside the country - it is inserted in the international "circuit of capital." 
The bureaucratic-authoritarian state also requires some actors that would support the 
dependent development and keep the multinational investment in the country. This is 
2 Technology developed in the peripheries. In dependent development most of the technology used in the 
process of industrialization comes from the core countries, and are provided by the multinational 
corporations. 
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where a concept of triple alliance elaborated mainly by Evans (1979) and Cardoso (1972) 
fits. 
Triple Alliance 
The triple alliance includes state, local bourgeoisie, and multinational corporations. It 
often takes place with the emergence of military rule. With the repressive state 
centralization of administration takes place with the repression of social protese as in the 
bureaucratic-authoritarian state. With those changes the peripheral country achieves a 
"high degree of political tranquility." The government tries to accelerate economic 
growth of the periphery through a combination of public and private enterprises. The next 
step undertaken by the state is the suppression of the local bourgeoisie while new 
"internationalized" bourgeoisie emerges. State signed contracts with the new emerging 
bourgeoisie and end pre-existing relations with the local bourgeoisie. The new 
bourgeoisie is not related to traditional social order and structures as the local 
bourgeoisie. Those new agreements with the state form a "bridge" between the interest of 
the nation and this of the entrepreneurs (Evans, 1979). The new bourgeoisie is associated 
with the multinational corporations as a junior partner and start to control their finances. 
With the support of the state, very promising opportunities are opened to the new 
bourgeoisie, at the same time omitting the majority of the society. As a result of this 
process, forces of modem capitalism are unleashed. Economy is increasingly restructured 
in accordance with the new patterns of international economic organization (Evans, 
1979). Foreign capital is also the greatest advertising sponsors in mass media, so it has 
the power to influence it and as such foreign culture and ideology have an access to local 
3 Useful as the triple alliance system favors only the chosen social class, which results in the increase of 
disproportions in the society 
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market what is producing bigger development of economic, political, and mass-cultural 
dependency. Once more, the effects of the triple alliance can be seen in the increasing 
disproportions of the peripheral nations and emergence of the dependent development. 
Triple alliance and the bureaucratic-authoritarian state concepts are very important 
showing the role of the state in the establishment of the dependent relationship with the 
core countries and multinational corporations and in producing increasing disparities in 
the society that lead to social dissatisfaction, and as such, to protest. 
Change in the System 
Dependency theories state that peripheral countries should never tighten their ties 
with core countries. Instead of relying upon foreign aid and foreign technology, they 
should adopt a self-reliance model that would provoke the decrease and finally stop the 
dependency toward core countries. Peripheries should rely upon their own paths of 
development, their own resources, and plan an autonomous national development. It does 
not mean isolation it just should not be dominated by other countries. There is a need to 
introduce equal and mutually beneficial terms of trade. Peripheries should get rid of old 
elite that would not like to resign from their ties with core countries, as they are closely 
related to foreign investment, interests, etc. Developing nations should finally unite in 
creating their own cartels as means of confronting the hegemony of industrial nations 
within the world system (Arghiri, 1972). This is a remedy for change but without a 
prescription. It is quite obvious that if some group is subordinate, it should end the 
subordination, but how? This theory does not acknowledge any kind of opposition 
against the dependency. The peripheries' lower classes are treated as passive ones with a 
very little capacity for uprising against the exploitation of the new bourgeoisie and 
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multinational corporations or to core countries' exploitation and all the eventual 
opposition is suppressed by the military regimes that are very popular in the peripheries. 
The classical dependency theory argues for the socialist revolution, however, the history 
showed that socialist revolutions do not work for the improvement of societies' standard 
of living. Also, the change that dependency theories talk about is at the power relation 
level of the states only. The change that dependency theory argues for is on the state level 
that would remove the dependency relationship of the periphery. However, it does not 
acknowledge the possibility of change within the periphery as a result of the protest 
against the repressive bureaucratic-authoritarian state's policies toward the society. It 
does not acknowledge any social grievance against the state. None of the development 
theories acknowledge the possibility of the emergence of any social movement that 
would be dangerous to the hegemony of the core countries. 
The bureaucratic-authoritarian state is expected to efficiently suppress all the 
eventual oppositions and social dissatisfaction. However, there are many dynamics taking 
place in the society that are not controlled by the state, especially if the state does not 
provide social support institutions or does not balance the distribution of goods in the 
society as it is the case in peripheries where triple alliance with a bureaucratic-
authoritarian state are present. The analysis of internal dynamics is needed that would 
discuss the stimuli behind the emergence of the social movements. Thus there is a need 
for additional concepts outside of development theories that posit the opportunity of 
resistance to domination. 
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CHAPTER III 
MOVEMENT THEORlES, DOMINATION, AND RESISTANCE 
The previous chapter focused on the external factors that may influence the 
emergence and functions of fundamentalist religious movements. Even though external 
factors playa very important role in the process of fundamentalist religious movements 
formation, they are not sufficient in order to create a complete framework and analyze the 
movements. The internal dynamics of societies also playa significant role in the creation 
and performance of fundamentalist religious movements. The literature about social 
movements makes important contributions to the development of a theoretical approach 
to the analysis of fundamentalist religious movements. The concepts from these 
approaches reveal how domination leads to resistance and how this resistance was 
organized. 
Social movements are "an expression of the associated activities of some group or 
field of actors" and "they cannot emerge when people are unable, for whatever reason, to 
form the minimal solidarity necessary for mounting or sustaining a challenge to 
authorities or cultural codes" (Goodwin, Jasper, 2004: 6, 19). Resource mobilization 
theory assumes that the basis for a movement to emerge is a grievance, some kind of 
conflict. Sidney Tarrow (1994) describes the social movements as "collective challenges 
by people with common purposes and solidarity in sustained interaction with elites, 
opponents and authorities." William Gamson (1992) supports this definition pointing out 
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that there are three necessary components for a collective action: injustice, agency, and 
identity. Injustice is the sense that society at large has failed to provide for a group for 
which they are responsible. In social movements the sense of injustice needs to be shared. 
Agency identifies who in the shared injustice group can make the change, who can push 
enough. It is useful to make the "we" as broad as possible, and yet for many movements 
it is crucial not to make it so broad that collective mobilization becomes too difficult. 
Finally, identity is the feeling of "we," the group that is able to make the change when the 
opposition to "they" is strong enough. If the distinction between the "we," and "they" is 
too abstract, the two become overlapped, thus leading to individual rather than collective 
action (Gamson, 2000: 2). 
Framing and Mobilization 
Social movements theorists see the emergence of movements as a result of 
political and economic processes. However, they look at it from the standpoint of the 
social actors and analyze how and when social actors get together. They point out the 
importance of "framing" as "conscious, strategic efforts by groups of people to fashion 
shared understanding of the world and of themselves that legitimate and motivate 
collective action" (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald, 1996: 6). 
Framing is part of the strategy of the movement in order to spread its "word" and 
activity. As the social actors mayor may not follow the leader, being rational actors of 
the society, it is important for the ideology to be well addressed by the head of the 
movement. In order to achieve their goals, movements must produce rhetorical packages 
that explain their claims within existing legitimate boundaries (Williams, 2002: 247). 
David Snow and Robert Benford (1988, 1992) point out that effective social movement 
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frames have to grant "diagnostic," "prognostic," and" motivational" functions, which 
means that they have to explain to movement participants what is wrong, what can be 
done to fix it, and why should they be involved in this movement. Movement's claims 
must make sense to the potential recruits. It implies alignment between what audience 
already knows, feels, or has experienced. Thus, movement's ideology must cover familiar 
ground, even as it offers self-conscious innovations (Williams, 2002: 250). Religious 
rhetoric and symbols are so often used in social movements. Religion offers both 
organizational and cultural resources to facilitate mobilization and helps achieve at least 
some success (Smith, 1996; Williams 1994). 
The movement's success or failure is largely dependent on how well it performs the 
necessary mobilization tasks. Therefore, social movements largely carry their fate in 
their own hands. If they organize well, recruit members and mobilize resources they are 
likely to be successful. If not, they are likely fail. However, the meaning of failure is 
different for different kinds of social movements as they operate at different level of the 
social structure and they have different goals. We distinguish four kinds of social 
movements: revolutionary movements, reform movements, alternative movements, and 
redemptive movements!. Revolutionary movements aim at the general restructuring the 
system of the society, for example from capitalist state to religious state. Reform 
movements hope to change specific feature of the society without changing the nature of 
it, for example women's movements. Alternative movements seek for a limited change 
among part of the society, for example Christian mothers. Finally redemptive movements 
I Besides Blumer's (1951) classification of social movements. He distinguished expressive, general, and 
specific social movements. His classification analyzed the organization of movements. 
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want to radically change the individual they engage into, for example Alcoholic 
Anonymous (Aberle, 1966; Cameron, 1966). 
Tilly (1978) suggests a mobilization model that shows the structure of social 
movement in its attempts to pursuit a common interest. This model includes five 
components: "interests" meaning the shared gains and losses likely to accumulate by the 
social movement. The second element is the "organization," which is the extent of 
common identity and unifying structure. The third element of the mobilization model is 
the "mobilization" itself that refers to the extent of resources under the collective control 
of the social movement. The fourth element consists of the "collective action," which is 
the extent of a social movement's joint action in pursuit of common ends. Finally, the 
fifth element of the mobilization model is the "opportunity" that consists of three 
components: "power" meaning the degree to which the outcomes of interaction favor the 
group's interests over others; "repression," which are the costs of collective action to the 
social movement, and finally, "opportunity" or threat that given social movements face in 
their relationship to governments or other authorities (Tilly, 1978). 
Political process theory argues that these are political opportunities that provoke the 
possibility and friendly environment for the movements to emerge. However, as Jose 
Saramago formulates it: 
The circumstances create the need, and the need, when it is great enough, creates the 
circumstances" (in: Goodwin, Jasper, 2004: vii) 
The concept of "framing" will be useful in the theoretical approach analyzing 
fundamentalist religious movements because it shows the ways that social opposition in 
the form of social movements can be organized, how can it emerge, and how it functions. 
Framing focuses on how social movement organizations go about recruiting and 
27 
mobilizing people, raising money, training members, etc. The focus is on the dynamics 
inside social movements and on the structure of the organization. Framing looks at social 
forces and internal dynamics on the micro level that will help understanding social 
movements and links the reasons for their emergence to aspects of the social structure of 
the society. Thos focus tends to exclude the external dynamics of international relations. 
Social movement theories are useful in providing the analysis of the organization 
of the movement, however their analysis of the mobilization ideology that captures the 
individual is their weakness. They do not acknowledge the transition from one ideology 
to another that the individual is subject to. Social movement theories are unable to 
explain the dynamics between two ideologies. In this thesis we suggest social actors leave 
one domination in order to enter another one. Social movements are driven by an 
ideology and led by a leader that transmits this ideology. This ideology shapes actors' 
perception of reality. In case of fundamentalist religious movements, the individual 
leaves the hegemony of the "McWorld" in order to enter the counter hegemony of 
religious fundamentalism. As social movement theories do not acknowledge this, we 
need to implement to our theoretical approach the concept of hegemony and counter-
hegemony elaborated by Antonio Gramsci. 
Antonio Gramsci' s concept of hegemony assumes a simple approval given by the 
majority of a population to a certain direction suggested by those in power where one 
class had succeeded in persuading the other classes of society to accept its own moral, 
political, and cultural values. The dominant class governs not through force or threat of 
force but through consent. People internalize hegemony and govern themselves (Stillo, 
1999). As Dominic Strinati puts it: 
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( ... ) Dominant groups in society, including fundamentalistly but not exclusively the ruling 
class, maintain their dominance by securing the 'spontaneous consent' of subordinate 
groups, including the working class, through the negotiated construction of a political and 
ideological consensus which incorporates both dominant and dominated groups (Strinati, 
1995: 165). 
Gramsci (2000) stated that civil societies are more dominated through hegemony than 
through coercion, even though he did not exclude the role of coercion. But through 
coercion the true hegemony will not emerge, as it is the ideology that is internalized that 
forms the true hegemony. Hegemony is internalized as natural and, as a result, blindly 
consumed by the masses as social reality. However, this hegemonic consent is not always 
peaceful, and may combine physical force or coercion with intellectual, moral and 
cultural inducement. 
Hegemony can be understood as "common sense," a cultural universe where the 
dominant ideology is practiced and spread; something that emerges out of social and 
class struggles, and serves to shape and influence people's minds. It is a set of ideas by 
means of which dominant groups strive to secure the consent of subordinate groups to 
their leadership (Stillo 1999). So, when one social group, or class is able to persuade 
another class to see the world in this class terms, the new hegemony, counter-hegemony 
is being born. As the counter-hegemony is fostered and spread primarily by intellectuals2, 
they have to create the new "common sense," as Gramsci sees the spread of hegemony 
mainly by the "mind revolution," not necessarily by the military one, even though he 
does not exclude this possibility. He sees the struggle for the new hegemony fought 
2 In Gramsci's understanding all people are intellectuals but not everybody has a function of one. 
Intellectuals for him are the representatives of the hegemonic power. He distinguishes two kinds of 
intellectuals: traditional and organic ones. Traditional intellectuals call themselves autonomous and 
independent from the dominant ideology and system, they see themselves and are seen as part of the 
historic continuity, but they can be persuaded to come over to the revolutionary side. Organic intellectuals 
grow with the new arising counter-hegemony. 
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through the mass media, ideas, books, music, speeches, etc. In this thesis it is argued that· 
counter-hegemony is created with the emergence of social movements with their own 
ideology and framing process. 
The process of the establishment of the new hegemony is composed with three 
stages: universalization, rationalization, and naturalization. Universalization is successful 
when organic intellectuals are able to persuade the society that their interests are the 
interests of the entire society. Rationalization is the stage where intellectuals rationalize 
their role and action they undertake in the society as excused and right for the society, as 
"normal." Finally, naturalization is the last stage during which the new hegemony 
becomes reified and becomes a "common sense." It is a time when the culture becomes 
the nature (Litowitz, 2000). 
Culture Domination and Society 
Culture can be part of the hegemony; it can be its tool. However, social movement 
theories recognize culture only as one of the factors present in the "framing." It can be 
true in case of fundamentalist religious movements, as charismatic leaders often call upon 
the "traditional" beliefs and belonging. However, the most visible culture in peripheries is 
the western "mcdonalized" culture. Social movements theorists do not acknowledge 
culture as part of the hegemony. In social movement theories culture is perceived as a 
foundation for a change. Even though there is a discussion between scholars where to 
locate it: whether it is a part of objective political opportunities or objective mobilization 
(McAdam, McCarthy, Zald, 1996: 8; McAdam, Tarrow, Tilly, 1997: 158) culture is not 
recognized as being part of the oppressive system against which social movements can 
react. Social movement theorists recognize culture as an opposition of political structure. 
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They see it as shaping potential challengers' perceptions of objective opportunities and 
shaping, enabling the actions of protesters. Culture is seen in social movement theories as 
mobilized by the powerless to challenge the structure (Polletta, 2004: 98). The approach 
proposed in this thesis recognizes culture as supporting the oppressive political structure, 
as part of the hegemonic system that Islamic fundamentalist religious movements are 
acting in response to. In order to validate and support this reasoning, the concept of 
culture industry elaborated by Theodor Adorno will be presented and added to the 
theoretical approach that is being developed in this work. 
Adorno (2002b) analyzed culture in capitalist system as a commodity. He saw 
culture not as a factor enabling the protest, but rather as a factor disabling the opposition 
against the capitalist system. He talked about the culture being a tool of capitalism in 
order to create people's pseudo individuality instead of the real one in order to have profit 
out of people as consumers, even during their leisure time. Adorno pointed out that 
culture as consumption that is part of the hegemony of the capitalist system. As he 
expresses it: 
Deceived masses are today captivated by the myth of success even more than the 
successful are. Immovably, they insist on the very ideology which enslaves them 
(Adorno 1947:9). 
With the expansion of capitalism, the culture industry expands as well, as it is part 
of capitalism. Adorno (2002b) pointed out the falseness of culture under the capitalist 
system that stops being unique and starts to be a false tranquilizer and an exchangeable 
product that brings profit. He criticized capitalism for dominating social life through the 
commodification of everyday life. He argued that people could be easily tricked by the 
capitalist system, as it can sell everything (this is the goal of capitalism - make unending 
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profit). As the main goal of the culture industry is to maintain the system of capitalism, 
and as such, to make more and more profit. He also argued that dominant social forces 
that profit out of those revenues create ideology that keeps people in false consciousness 
(Adorno, 2002b). 
In "Dialectic of Enlightment," Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno (2002a) 
state that the source of today's misfortune, (we can understand it as the source of 
underdevelopment), is blind domination. They understand domination in a triple sense: 
the domination of nature by human beings, domination of nature within human beings, 
and, in both of these forms of domination, the domination of some human beings by 
others. They distinguished three modes of domination: social domination, internal 
domination, and domination of nature. The first designates domination over other people; 
the second domination of one's self (or "internal nature" which is explained by the 
emergence of culture industry), and the third domination of external nature (economic 
domination explained by the dependency theory). Crucially, they sawall three modes as a 
totality. In order to break this totality, overcoming just one of the three modes of 
domination would not be enough, all must be surpassed, or none will be (Adorno 
1998:250). The third mode of domination elaborated by Horkheimer and Adorno (2002a) 
is based on external nature, which means external factors. In case of developing 
countries, this is the domination by developed, core countries that is discussed by the 
dependency and world system theories. 
The term culture industry refers to the production and consumption of mass 
culture (Adorno, 2002b). Adorno argues that culture no longer emerges from individual 
people in order to satisfy esthetic needs but it comes from the dominant social forces. The 
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culture industry includes all mass media and the means of cultural production (art, 
fashion, etc.) that produce the ideology. Adorno supports his statements by showing how 
all the standardization of cultural items takes place in societies, how they are regulated, 
promoted, distributed, and consumed, how it is all an industrial and mass production, like 
in a factory. 
Adorno (2002b) sees culture industry as fundamentally related to the economic 
system. They are both interrelated as the culture industry arose from capitalism in a way 
that even culture was turned into an exchangeable and profitable commodity/product. All 
cultures become commodified under the capitalist system. All individuals are 
categorized, subsumed, and governed by restrictive social, economic, and political 
structures that are concerned with profit, not individuals. As such, individuals have 
become objects like other commodities. The goal of the culture industry is profit, similar 
to capitalism. This structure forces people to categorize and divide into different conform 
identity thinking that destroys any critical thinking producing standardized commodified 
culture. Culture Industry "becomes a mass deception and is turned into means for 
fettering consciousness. It impedes the development of autonomous, independent 
individuals who judge and decide consciously for themselves" (Adorno 2002b: 7). 
Standardization is a result of the characteristics of capitalism, which are mass 
production, mechanization of the production, distribution, and consumption of the 
produced commodities. Commodities take life on their own - independent of their 
production conditions (i.e., McDonald is identified with the United States and its politics, 
economy and culture while it is only selling food). 
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What the debate about the Culture Industry implies is that at first it was the 
bourgeoisie who were creating the ideology. However, nowadays these are the 
multinationals boards who dictate how, why, and when to think what. People are 
manipulated even without knowing it. It is a period of culture industry hegemony, and as 
such, a period of capitalist hegemony as the culture industry spreads with capitalism. It 
offers the illusion of freedom, but not true autonomous freedom. 
People buy into the dominant culture, as they are not offered any other choice. It 
IS internalized as natural and, as a result, blindly consumed by the masses as social 
reality. As such, Adorno does not see any place for individuality. He says that 
individuality is impossible in the culture industry. Individuals consume and internalize 
the pseudo-individuality sold to them by the mass media making them think they are 
being different and consuming "original" products that are meant to signify the self 
expression, but still, those are just products that make profit to the dominant class and as 
such they sustain the capitalist system. "The customer is not a king, as the culture 
industry would have us believe, not its subject, but its object" (Adorno 2002a: 10). 
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CHAPTER IV 
HISTORY OF NIGERIA: ROLE OF ISLAM AND THE WEST 
This chapter will present the history of Nigeria with the concentration on Islam, 
which was a leading ideology of Maitatsine movement. It will be necessary in order to 
understand the dynamics and reasons for the popularity of the Maitatsine fundamentalist 
Islamic movement in the country. The chapter presenting the history of Nigeria is needed, 
as the history in this work being a historical sociology analysis constitutes the data for the 
analysis of religious movement. 
Nigeria is a unique country created artificially during colonization period. It has a 
unique history and social structure. Its society is geopolitically fragmented into numerous 
ethnic groups. There are 250 distinct ethnic groups, where Hausa-Fulani, Igbo, and 
Y oruba are the largest ones. The country is also divided regionally into the north and 
south. This division goes along religious divisions with 50% of the population being 
Muslims, 40% Christian, and 10% practicing traditional religions. (Gordon, 2003: xv). 
Beginnings 
Islam was not the only religion imported into West Africa. However, as it has been 
present in the region since the 8th century, Islam was able to intertwine with local 
religions and to function with them in a unique symbiosis. Its influence and role evolved 
with time. First Islamic missionaries were Arabic and Mauritanian traders who traveled 
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in 8th century from Southern Morocco to rich lands of West Africa looking for gold, kauri 
shells, and kola nuts (J ibrin, 1991: 116). 
First, Islam was only a religion of traveling traders but very quickly it became a 
political tool used by local chiefs. It is much later that it was assimilated enough to 
become a system of beliefs shared by the majority of the region integrating various ethnic 
groups. From the 10th to the 13th century Islam was spreading gradually and for the most 
part peacefully. The main agents of Islamization during this period were those itinerant 
traders, a few scholars, mostly Almoravid Berbers, and indigenous converts (Bugaje, 
1987: 1). Local craftsmen like blacksmiths, tanners, jewelers, etc. also played a 
significant role in the process of Islamization. They were settling among worshippers of 
local religions and functioning not only as craftsmen but also as agents and bankers 
representing Diula or Rausa traders. Those two ethnic groups were part of specialized 
trade organizations that were spreading the word of Islam in Western Africa 
(Pilaszewicz, 2000: 224). 
Rausa people are closely related to the introduction and eventual success of Islam in 
Northern Nigeria. They are now in majority Muslims and occupy mainly the region of 
Northern Nigeria and Southern Niger, so the region where the social movement that will 
be analyzed in this work was situated. Rausa are a mixture of diverse ethnic groups who 
have used origin myths in order to create a sense of common identity through heritage 
from common ancestor at a fixed point in the history (Gordon, 2003: 32). They migrated 
from the Sahara desert due to climatic changes in 8th century B.c. to Central Sudan and 
settled there. They started assimilating to local ethnic groups (Berbers, Zaghawa, 
Garamants), which in long historical process (trade and warfare) resulted in the creation 
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of the Hausa (which means "language") ethnic group (Miles, 1994). As part of their 
heritage and common ancestry, Hausa people claim their origin from Bayajidda, a prince 
from Baghdad (which is a very important place for Muslims). He was supposed to save a 
city of Daura from a giant snake, and was rewarded by the marriage of the queen of 
Daura. Their seven sons were the future rulers of seven maini"true" Hausa cities, Hausa 
Bakwai (Hausa state does not exist - there are separate, autonomous city-states, and each 
one of them used to have its own specialty in the region - warfare, trade, art, etc.) "next" 
to seven false Hausa cities Banza Bakwai. Historians relate the character of Bayajidda to 
legendary Abu Yazid, Islamic leader, who had to migrate from the Middle East toward 
Sahara, and ended up in Central Sudan. The marriage with a queen would be a symbol of 
the passage from matriarchal to patriarchal system present in the Islam. The killing of the 
evil snake is a symbol of the change of religion from local traditional religions to Islam 
where snake was a symbol of local traditional belief system (Hiskett, 1984, Pilaszewicz, 
1994). 
Next to Hausa people, another ethnic group that was establishing itself in the 
Hausaland were the Fulani: nomadic people who's early records show that they have 
lived in the medieval Saharan kingdom of Mali. In 15th century certain Fulani clans 
migrated from Mali to Hausaland. Gradually, their number increased. In 18th century they 
were considered a significant population in Hausaland consisting in both nomadic cattle-
raising clans and the sedentary clan of the Toronkawa. Once the Fulani began living 
among the Hausa, they started intennarrying with them. Over generations, many Fulani 
adopted Hausa language and customs. As a result, it became difficult to tell the Fulani 
apart, and as such the tenn Hausa-Fulani emerged that is applied to them. Although 
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Hausa and Fulani are mixture of different people, they are now often identified as one 
ethnic group (Gordon, 2003: 15). In the future history of the Islam in West Africa, Fulani 
played a very important role. 
As Islam is not only a religion, but also an administrative, judicial, and philosophical 
system, the entire states can be formed and function along Koranic laws and 
administration. In 11 Ih century, when wondering traders were spreading the word of Islam 
peacefully and slowly in the Hausaland, the first Islamic State of Takrur was formed. 
During the same time, in 1042 the Almovarid movement' declared the holy war in 
Morocco (Pilaszewicz, 1994: 17). In I11h century they began laying the foundations of an 
empire covering entire Morocco and parts of Algeria. In 1052 Almoravids declare war on 
the Empire of Ghana (today's region of southeastern Mauritania and southwestern Mali) 
that finished with the fall of its capital in 1076 (Badru, 2004: 248). The capital of the 
Almoravids was the newly founded Marrakech. In 1086 they defeated Alfonso VI of 
Castile to gain much of Spain. 
Muslims, knowing how to read and write in Arabic, were considered more educated 
and had higher status than followers of other religions. Arabic, the holly language of 
Koran could be compared at that time to Latin in Medieval Europe. It was not only a 
language of religion but it was present in education and development of literature. This is 
the reason why if a chief was a Muslim, he could use the religion as an additional element 
to legitimize his power. Furthermore, traveling Muslim traders were very influential and 
wealthy. If a local chief was also a Muslim, he could negotiate better trading agreements 
with the traders. All those reasons were responsible for such an appreciation of Islam in 
African societies at first. 
, The Almoravids came from the island on Senegal River. 
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Development oflslam 
The period between 14th and 16th century is a time when Muslim states of Mali and 
Songhay emerged and developed into significant political entities in West Africa. During 
this period Kanem-Bornu reached its mature stage under the rein of Idris Aloma. Many 
Hausa city-states, e.g. Kano and Katsina became Islamized. This was also a time when 
educational centers developed and produced many of indigenous scholars like Abdul-
Rahman AI-Sa'adi, Ahmad Baba, AI-Barnawi, Mahmud Kati, and many others (Bugaje, 
1987: 1). During this time Western Africa was visited by many visiting scholars such as 
Muhammad AI-Maghili and Ibn Batuta who deepened the knowledge about Islam and 
fired-up the fascination by this religion among local intellectuals (Pilaszewicz, 1994: 40, 
43). 
The period between the vital development of Islam and the beginning of the Holy 
Wars (l6th - 19th century) was filled with chaos and invasions. Morocco invaded 
Timbuktu, the intellectual center of the region. The destruction of the state of Songhay, 
conquest of Timbuktu, and the Hausa inter-states wars resulted in the dispersion of 
Islamic scholars in the region. In 18th century, Muslim communities were well 
established in the region, but still they could not be described as predominantly Islamic. 
By the end of 18th century one could observe an increase of disapproval by a number 
of Muslim scholar toward local un-Islamic customs and behaviors. The scholars started 
pushing more decisively for the adoption of Islamic alternatives. The kinds of things they 
objected to were the idolatrous rites of animism: sacrifices and libations to various 
objects of worship; failure' to observe the Islamic food prohibitions and prohibited 
degrees of marriages (chiefs could have tens of wives); the survival of matrilineal 
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inheritance instead of patrilineal one that is prescribed by Islam. Scholars also frequently 
accused Hausa songs and the addiction to dance and traditional music to be impure 
(Hiskett, 1973: 7-8). This was a sign that Islam is gaining on importance and influence in 
the region. 
Also, Fulani Muslims being a minority in Habe kingdoms felt they were treating 
unfairly even though with their ability to read and write and being in contact with the 
"higher" Arabic culture they felt they should be part of the leading majority. As part of 
the minority, they had to pay taxes that were not included in the Shari'ah law (Islamic 
law) to which they felt obliged to obey. Also, as Muslim communities were parts of 
different ethnic groups, Muslims often found themselves fighting against other Muslims, 
which is a very big sin in Islam. Finally, Muslim Fulani communities were from distinct 
ethnic groups than those who were in power (Pilaszewicz, 1994: 91). 
The growing dissatisfaction with life as it was in the Habe (dynasty ruling in the 
Hausa city-states) kingdoms, as contrasted with the Islamic ideal, led to several Fulani 
Islamic movements, from which the one of Shehu Uthman dan Fodio was the most 
significant (Hiskett, 1973: 8). 
Fulani leaders were members of the Quadiriyya mystic (sufi) 
brotherhoodlorderltariqua2• They were representing an elitist mysticism that welcomed 
Islamic scholars rather than ordinary people. They believed in the divine connection 
between the brotherhood's leader and God. They believed and waited for the next prophet 
to come. Their goal was to reform the society according to the divine Islamic rules. 
(Pilaszewicz, 1994: 91). 
2 tariqua is the Rausa name for the Sufi brotherhood 
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Based on the Quadiriyya Islamic rules the Fulani and Tukuler holy wars started in 
West Africa leading to a significant Islamization of Western Africa, including the region 
of Northern Nigeria. 
Holy Wars 
First there was a Fulani jihad3 (the Military holy war) in 1725 in Futa Jalon, today's 
Guinea, organized by Ibrahim Musa and then his successor Ibrahim Sori. The country 
Futa J alon, structured after the victories had a theocratic form. It was an idealistic state 
organization led by religious leaders. It was a hierarchical structure where the political-
religious elite was the state authority (Pilaszewicz, 1994: 93). 
The second jihad was led by a member of the Tukuler ethnic group, Sulayman Bal. It 
took place in Futa Toro in today's Senegal and was led against the "pagan" Fulani of the 
Futa Toro rulers. In 1776 the successor of Sulayman Bal defeated the Fulani and 
established a theocratic state where Islam was a national religion. He spread his authority 
over all the ethnic groups living in the region: Wolof, Soninke, Bambara, and Mandingo 
(Pilaszewicz, 1994: 94). Futa Toro fell in 1864. 
The third theocratic Islamic state that was a result of the military jihad emerged in 
Dina4• It was established by Seku (Shehu) Amadu who was a member of the Fulani 
scholars related to the Quadiriyya brotherhood. In 1815 he founded the capital of Dina, 
Hamdullahi5, an Islamic state where executive, legislative, and judicial authority was in 
the hands ofIslamic scholars and was based on the Shari'ah law (Pilaszewicz, 1994: 96). 
The state of Dina survived until the French invasion in 1893. 
3 Muslim layers distinguish four types of jihad (that means serving Islam with action): jihad of heart 
(showing mercy), language (spreading the word), hands (social work), and sword (military) (Danecki, 
1998:255) 
4 Dina in Arabic means "religion" 
5 Hamdullahi in Arabic means "Praise the Lord" 
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Finally, the most radical changes in Islam occurred during Uthman dan Fodio's holy 
war in the beginning of the 19th century. Dan Fodio's successful jihad caused the 
establishment of Nigeria's first caliphate. The Sokoto-based caliphate was divided into 
Emirates, and a single caliph oversaw all the Emirs. A qadi (Islamic judge) was in control 
of the Shari'ah law to be applied in courts. Islamic law spread quickly over the wide 
region covered by the new caliphate (FaIola, 1998, Pilaszewicz 1994, Gordon, 2003). In 
place of the chiefs from the Habe dynasty, Shehu appointed his senior lieutenants as 
Emirs6 over the conquered kingdoms. Muhammadu Bello, Shehu's son and successor as 
caliph (supreme Islamic ruler) later founded the city of Sokoto that became the 
administrative capital of the Fulani Empire. The empire comprised nearly all the 
Hausaland and extended its political influence further westward, across the river Niger. 
Their empire was protected by a screen of ribats (border fortresses) behind which 
societies were formed according to Islamic ideal model (Hiskett, 1973: 9). However, in 
the more distant bush areas there were remains of societies that continued to live 
according to local religions, customs, and traditions (Hiskett, 1973: 11). 
It is important to note that Fulani jihads were not wars about the conversion but about 
the reform. Their goal was not to tum non-believers into Muslims but to tum Muslims 
into Sunnah followers?, the "true" Islam. As the Sokoto Caliphate was established, initial 
alliances between the literate class of Islamic morality (the ulamas) and rulers quickly 
dissipated and power conflict arose (Miles, 2003: 53). 
6 Emir in Arabic means "army commander" 
? Sunnah followers consist a majority of Muslims in the Muslim world. They are the most orthodox part of 
Muslims. They follow the sunnah, "tradition"/tales about prophet Muhammad, based on which the Islamic 
rulers (caliphs) are chosen based on the traditional, nomadic way in opposition to shiy'a where Islamic 
rulers have to have roots in prophet's Muhammad family and reject the tradition/tales about the prophet. 
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During Uthman dan Fodio's holy war time, Islam appeared in the entire Sahel and 
was accepted by the maj ority of the population in the area of today' s northern Nigeria. In 
urban areas it took the place of traditional religions, or accommodated traditional 
religions, and started to shape points of view about the world and society. It started 
influencing the administration and the ruling system of the Hausa city-states, even though 
in rural areas local religions still prevailed. The lifestyle of the people started to be one of 
Islamic solidarity, especially in the umma (Islamic community). This feeling of unity 
among Muslims introduced the division of the society into the Muslims and non-
Muslims. This division into in-groups and out-group helped to further the development of 
precise religious movements aimed at creating and strengthening the solidarity among the 
members of the group and exclude all "others." 
The history of Islam in West Africa goes along with the adaptation of the Holy Koran 
to local religions. Every African local religion has given a unique beauty to Islam: parts 
of its local social structures, local beliefs, norms, and values. In African Studies, there is a 
name for African Islam called "Black/African Islam,S" which differs significantly from 
the orthodox Islam that was fought for during the Holy Wars of the 19th century, and 
which is being fought for today. Islam is a religion that is easily adapted to African local 
social structures and sets of beliefs since it tolerates them more than Christianity does. 
This is the reason why Islam had greater success in West Africa than Christianity. Islam 
only in small degree changes African traditional life, allowing for example for polygyny. 
Even though very often women are subjected to seclusion, they are then "rewarded" by 
8 The term of "Black Islam" is sometimes viewed as negative by African communities as a reflection of 
negative aspects related to the word "black" (black plague, dirty, evil, etc.) 
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the Islamic right of inheritance after the death of their husband. This did not exist in 
many traditional religions (Pilaszewicz, 2000: 225-226). 
In today's Nigeria, the Yoruba (who are, like Hausa, a mixture of diverse peoples) 
having one of the largest mythologies in their religion (even bigger than Greek 
mythology) accommodated and incorporated some unorthodox beliefs that gave the 
Y oruba Islam a different orientation. Southwestern Muslims were less critical of Y oruba 
indigenous religion and political authority. Muslims did not encourage Imams to displace 
local kings or to tum the region into theocracy (FaIola, 1998: 27). Y oruba Muslims did 
not call for the Shari'ah to displace local laws or to subvert local authorities. 
While orthodox Muslims criticized what they called paganism, many aspects of 
traditional religions came to influence even orthodox Islamic practices, or at least became 
tolerated to a degree that enabled people of different religions to coexist. For example, 
cults of nature spirits exist in some form or another among all African Muslims whatever 
is their stage of Islamization (Spencer-Trimingham, 1959: 106). This successful 
accommodation of Islam would later prove to be an element that minimized religious 
tension and violence in the Southeastern region of Nigeria (FaIola, 1998: 27). Even to this 
day, Yoruba are subjected to customary law rather than to Shari'ah (Pilaszewicz, 2000: 
226). 
The Igbo, living in east southern part of Nigeria and are a diverse people of more than 
200 groups, were the only big ethnic group in present Nigeria that did not convert to 
Islam. Because of the early contacts with Christian missionaries in early 19th century, 
Igbo adopted another universal religion, Christianity, which they assimilated into 
traditional religions. 
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With the beginning of colonialism, from 1900s, the British significantly changed the 
relations of power and influence in the region. Mainly, they altered and replaced the 
Fulani Islamic political units. 
Nigeria 
The end of 19th century was the beginning of European expansion to Africa. Increased 
interest among the European powers in colonizing Africa from the late 1870s created a 
desire to define to "the rules of the game," and to define their respective interests so far as 
practicable. The Berlin Conference of 1884-1885 regulated European colonization and 
trade in Africa (the Berlin General Act was signed on November 15, 1884). West Africa 
was divided into France and Britain. It was a beginning of colonization of Africa, a 
military, economic, political, and cultural oppression and domination of one country over 
another. 
Nigeria was an artificially created conglomeration of diverse ethnicities and other 
loosely related groups. Built by conquest and suppression, the state never acquired any 
enduring legitimacy or trust from different ethnic groups (FaIola, 1998: 52). However, its 
region had vast deposits of oil, uranium, tin, gold, timber, and rubber that were very 
useful for the process of capital accumulation for the British who colonized Nigeria 
(Badru, 1998: 3). 
Already in 1861 the British established their protectorate in Lagos that became the 
first British colony in Nigeria. However, it was only in 1914, January 1, when Lord 
Lugard, the first British Governor-General of Nigeria finalized the amalgamation of the 
Protectorate of Northern Nigeria and Protectorate of Southern Nigeria that were 
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previously administered as separate territories. This date IS generally perceived as 
Nigeria's birthday (Osaghae, 1998; Gordon, 2003). 
The colonial state was coercive in its efforts to establish power and attain narrow 
economic objectives. Colonial dependence was based on the monopolization of 
commercial and financial capital of the colony by the dominant country. It controlled the 
land, mines, social resources, and the export of natural resources (raw materials, tropical 
products etc.) from the colonized country (Dos Santos, 1971). 
Colonizers implanted new cities in the "Third World" with the goal of facilitating the 
transfer of economic surplus to Western countries. National cities became satellites of 
Western metropolis. These satellites became colonial metropolises with the respect to the 
provincial cities. The peripheries were underdeveloped by the expropriation of its 
surplus product (the source of investment), in the form of raw materials, minerals, 
commodities, profits, etc. first to local capitals/local colonial metropolises, and then to 
Western countries. Under noncolonial circumstances this surplus could be used by local 
governments to produce sustainable development (Alvin, So, 1990). 
British and French administration systems and Islam 
France had colonies among others in Cameroon and Niger. It regarded its colonies as 
part of greater France, and people from different cultures were to be assimilated into 
French civilization. It implied direct ruling model with the tendency of colony's close 
integration with the French state and culture. For Africans, it meant the introduction of 
French education system, French administrative system with French officials, 
introduction of French language on all levels of political, economic, judicial, and social 
life. Ideally, it was supposed to make new conquered territories an extended France. As a 
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result, Islam was not a welcomed element in this new model (Hiskett, 1984; Spencer 
Trimingham, 1959; Pilaszewicz, 1994). France had a dual approach toward Islam in the 
colonies that showed indecisiveness in their policy: one was pro-Muslim, and the other 
not so much. Some governors adopted the policy of fostering Islam, as they regarded it as 
a "stage toward civilization," and allowed any village that wanted to have a mosque to 
have one. Muslims were considered as useful interpreters and were often made local 
chiefs. Similarly, governors allowed Islamic law to govern the personal and social law of 
anyone who could possibly be called Muslim. The French at first recognized Islamic 
education and allowed for Koranic schools but later replaced them with French education 
(Spencer-Trimingham, 1959: 206-207). 
Unlike France, Great Britain in Nigeria, introduced a system of indirect rules. It was 
based on the policy of exploitation of the colony, not its assimilation, with the minimum 
of British investment, both in financial and in human resources. Indirect rule involved the 
use of local chiefs called "the native authority," charged to implement colonial policies. 
Chiefs appointed as native authorities were responsible for taxation, for implementing 
British policies, and for the provision of native labor for colonial public works (Badru, 
1998: 70). Britain had decided to educate Africans to serve in the colonial administration. 
This had the advantage of minimizing the need for British administrators to directly tax 
people or force the colonial policy on them. Theoretically, colonial rule was supposed to 
be less visible with the native authority, and as such provoked less resistance to colonial 
rule. It was intended to develop a fully-fledged parallel administrative structure and 
plausibly create the native authority (Nantang Ben Jua, 1995). Also, it was a reduction of 
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costs for the British administration (British officials would be more expensive than local 
ones) (Gordon, 2003: 75). 
This indirect rule system helped the spread of Islam and enabled Islamic law to gain 
greater influence in the region. Under the British rule, Islamic law in Northern Nigeria 
gradually overruled customary laws (Spencer-Trimingham, 1959; Hiskett, 1984, 
Pilaszewicz, 1994; Gilliland, 1986). Appointees of the Caliphate and Emirates were 
imposed as rulers even on the non-Muslim groups as the "native authority" (Osaghae, 
1998: 2). However, under colonial rules, Islam was denied any opportunities for political 
unification and political force. Hiskett (1984) states that this resulted in the fact that 
colonial occupation weakened, to some extent, the traditional ties in Muslim world, as 
Muslims were discouraged to undertake pilgrimages to Mekka and other Muslim states 
(1984: 282-284). The Islamic jihad, intended to purify and spread Islam, became difficult 
to carry out, as the presence of the colonial government controlled local communities. 
However, these obstacles for the spread of Islam were noticeable only on macro-level 
relations. On the micro-level Islam was the element that often tightened inter-group 
relations. Spencer Trimingham (1959) described social migrations ofIslamic migrants to 
big towns, Migrants were retaining their traditional and religious ties settling in special 
quarters with their ethnic groups and kept on practicing their traditions and religion. 
Muslims in the cities were viewed as the most traditional and conservative of all the 
inhabitants. But thanks to this, people were feeling secure in the new environment 
(Spencer Trimingham, 1959: 215). 
On the other side, although the Emirs had power, they were subordinated to white 
Christian officers. The British reduced the status of the Sultans to that of an Emir. Most 
48 
sitting Emirs were removed by the British, and replaced with leaders chosen from the 
more "faithful to the colony" group. They made it clear to the new Emirs and other high 
officials that the native authority will maintain their positions as long as they are loyal to 
their British "masters." The British also changed the judicial system to lessen the 
"conservatism" of the Shari' ah law. For the Islamic community the fact that Emirs were 
implementing British policies that were considered "un-Islamic" demonstrated their 
impotence to the people (Gordon, 2003: 76). However, regardless of the loss of 
independent authority, many of the northern traditional religious elite prospered under the 
colonial rule. The position of Emirs retained considerable authority and functioned as 
native authority, and they had material benefits because of these functions. Partially, 
native authority became a platform in maintaining the colonial rule in Nigeria (Gordon, 
2003: 78). Later on it became one of the main points in the ideology of the struggle of 
new Islamic religious movements. The fact that Emirs and other Islamic officials were 
part of the colonial apparatus provoked that they stopped to be respected by the local 
Muslims and were considered as part of the neo-colonial oppression. As such, they were 
called to resign from their positions and accept the "true" Islam. 
Emirs working for the British were fighting in their own way. There was a conflict 
regarding proposed modernizations and secularization of the Shari' ah law by the 
colonizers. Those propositions were not well accepted by the Islamic intelligentsia who 
saw those modernizations as a threat to their power and to Islam as a whole (FaIola, 
1998: 29). 
At the same time, native authority that included local chiefs and Emirs needed 
western educated local administration that was supposed to be created from Africans. As 
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the British goal was a self-governing colony, the British organized Western schools that 
were teaching and socializing Africans into Western culture, and producing new class of 
local clerics, who became "civilized" and who worked for the British administration. 
These new elite became assimilated to Western culture. They were becoming a bridge 
between local chiefs who were made responsible for tax collections and keeping order in 
their villages and the British authority. Indirect rule model was a combination of a new 
bureaucracy with some remains from indigenous politics. Chiefs, or Emirs who were held 
accountable to colonial officers, were to administer their own people, and as such they 
lost the authority for their people by working for the colonizer. While many suffered 
cutbacks in independent power, several were upgraded in status and enjoyed more power 
than they had before (FaIola, 1998: 51). 
Christianity and Islam 
With colonization, Christian missionary work expanded in scale and scope. First 
missionaries arrived in Nigeria in the 1840s. By the end of colonial period, Christianity 
had emerged as a dominant religion in eastern Nigeria among the Igbo, and as a major 
religion in west and mid-western Nigeria. Catholic officials used the schools to increase 
their influence among the population (especially Igbo). In western part of Nigeria, all 
areas were affected by missionary activity (FaIola, 1998: 33). Only Islamic north was 
always problematic for Christian missionaries. During the 19th century, many 
missionaries hoped to add the north to the Christian kingdom, but only few of them, 
dedicated to their mission the most, could tolerate Islam. Many thought that Christianity 
is superior to Islam, that Islam is a creation of the devil. Those arrogant views about 
Islam contributed significantly to the hostility between the two religions. Evangelization 
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in the north was difficult. Missionaries were required to get permission to work from the 
Emirs and were allowed to work only far from cities or in immigrant communities 
(FaIola, 1998: 34). 
Christianity along with the British administration also had problems with the rise of 
"Mahdism," a belief present in mystic traditions9, which was the greatest Islamic threat to 
the statehood and the colonial authorities. This was a trans-Saharan anti-colonial 
movement. It originated from a messianic doctrine similar to that in Judaism. Muslims 
believed that at the tum of each century, a Mahdi would emerge with the powers to 
strengthen Islam and make justice triumph and lead all the Muslims to salvation. Many 
Muslims waited for the Mahdi. Some Mahdists regarded the forces of Lord Lugard as 
Satan. They saw any pact with the British and subsequent rule by Christians as worse 
than death (Shedrack Best, 1999). 
In all the political, economic, and social changes, that took place with the colonial 
conquest and in the eventual arrival of the Mahdi, many Muslim communities saw the 
coming of the end of the world. Increasing industrialization, evangelization, and 
destruction of traditional social structures were interpreted as an approaching apocalypse. 
Colonial armies were identified as the army of the savage Gog and Magog that was 
supposed to threaten the peace of Muslims at the end of the world (Pilaszewicz, 1994: 
139). This is when different religious movements with charismatic leaders claiming to be 
the'Mahdi started to emerge started to find large popularity among Africans, One of the 
reasons that made them fall into those new religious movements was the fact that with 
colonial administration older loyalties to kings, gods, and chiefs ended, except for the 
9 mystic traditions include beliefs in saints, mahdis, It is an unorthodox version ofIslam, where there is not 
only the only and unique God that is important. Those beliefs are present mainly in Africa, among 
brotherhoods. 
51 
loyalty toward universal religions (Christianity or Islam, that were pretty recent 
loyalties). The lack of such allegiances produced also bitter rivalries for power and 
wealth. As a result of the colonial policy of "divide and rule,1O" intergroup struggles 
among Nigerians for privileges and resources were promoted. 
Only the old caliphate in the north of Nigeria was preserved, while many indigenous 
chiefs and kings in the country saw their power enhanced (FaIola, 1998: 52-53). New 
classes and elites were forming, especially in the export related agricultural activities and 
in mining. In the countryside, local officials responsible for the export of natural 
resources and crops gave rise to the differentiation of the peasantry and emergence of a 
new African middle class, the compradorlbourgeoisie class (Badru, 1998: 5). 
However, this new colonial client-master system contained the seeds of its own 
destruction. The new class of educated Africans was especially hostile toward native 
authority. After having accommodated British hegemony for a considerable period of 
time, the new educated comprador class started clamoring for independence. Most were 
educated in Christian mission schools. They were located in the expanding cities of the 
south. The impact of this was twofold. On one hand, these "civilized" elite sought to 
emulate their masters' lives. On the other, this new educated class felt that their education 
qualified them for more power and influence over development of their societies. Their 
ambitions increased after the British allowed them limited participation in the legislative 
council that was created in Lagos. Although Africans played an important role in the 
colonial administration, but once the colonial administration was fully developed, the 
British started marginalizing those Africans who were educated along western models. 
10 By dividing the solidarity of indigenous people, the control over a region was easier for the colonists 
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As a result of this marginalization, the traditional and religious authorities became the 
favored ones in the colonial system (Nantang Ben Jua, 1995; Gordon, 2003). 
At the same time, traditional and religious leaders were understandably hostile 
toward the educated Africans. Accepting western standards of living, living in big cities, 
the new educational elite was not considered as representative of most Africans, as it 
claimed to be. However, the new elite educated in western system viewed African 
societies through the prism of European civilization, they wanted to modernize the 
"backward" traditional societies. With colonialism, elements of racial thinking started to 
emerge at this time. Africans (the "natives") were perceived in a negative light, they were 
viewed as backward ones in comparison with Europeans. The Africans that had western 
education were considered "civilized" (Gordon, 2003: 82). 
The British colonial policy of "divide and rule" was very successful, but resulted in 
many divisions in today's Nigeria. Those divisions are visible along the different lines. 
By supporting the feudalistic, theocratic Hausa-Fulani system in the north, the British 
have created a significant cultural, political, and economic gap between the northern and 
southern regions. Closing the north to Christian missionaries, the British prevented 
people from the northern region to have access to western education by reinforcing 
Koranic education system in the north. In the 1920s, only 125 elementary schools from 
the total of 4,000 were in the north. None of the 18 secondary schools were in northern 
Nigeria (Gordon, 2003: 82). With the popularity ofIslamic education in northern Nigeria, 
western education was perceived as less legitimate or irrelevant. This popularity of Islam 
provoked the situation, where in order for western educated Muslims to compete 
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culturally and politically in the North, they had to publicly demonstrate how much 
Islamic knowledge they possess (Umar, 2001: 140). As Umar (2001) expressed it: 
Western-educated Muslims must demonstrate their Islamic credentials more emphatically 
to compensate for the perceived deficiency resulting from their educational background 
(Umar, 2001: 144). 
What is interesting is that in many cases those western educated Muslims having to 
prove their Islamic background were establishing new orthodox Islamic movement 
themselves or joining the ones that already existed. 
The north - south division also reveals a fragmentation along religious lines. As 
Christian missionaries did not have access to northern parts of Nigeria, Islam did not 
have any obstacles to finish its jihad (conversion into Islam) in the north while 
Christianity could spread in the south. Additionally, as northern parts of Nigeria were 
inhabited mainly by Fulani-Hausa people, and southern parts by the Yoruba and Igbo, 
those divisions reinforced also ethnocentrisms of those three ethnic groups and, as a 
result, increased the tensions between them (Gordon, 2003: 82). Ethnic labels were 
assigned to every of the three regions (Hausa-Fulani, Igbo, and Yoruba) that were 
administered during the colonial period, what continued after independence. It has 
created, modified, and reinforced pre-colonial identities, and finally created separate state 
units that started and continued to develop along different lines and with different 
rapidity (Osaghae, 1998: 4). 
Tensions also increased by the fact of intense migration of people that started during 
the period of colonialism. Changes in agriculture and development of industry made 
people move along those changes. For example, many young people from different 
ethnicities moved to the cocoa plantations (cocoa became major export crop) in the 
Y orubaland. Many Igbo moved to Lagos, city dominated by Y oruba. In cities, ethnicities 
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kept living in separaled neighhorhoods that \\'as orten provoking urh(JJ1 tensions (Gordon, 
2003: 87). 
As \ve can see, the impact of colonialism on Islam can he viewed from two different 
angles. On one side, the establishment of internal security, good communication (new 
railroads, roads. etc.), and even urbanization tended to help the spread of Islam in West 
Africa. However, on the other hand, introduction of material goods, Western education 
\\'ith new ideas and patterns of behavior, denial for political Islamic unification of 
different ummas across the region and continent were the obstacles for the spread of this 
religion (Hiskett, 1973: 14). 
What is certain is that while Islam received no permanent set-backs, the older 
generation experienced changes in their way of life, but the new generation grew up 
accustomed from the start to new culture, set of beliej~;, and lived the change of status of 
their people, from colonial subordination to the challenge of shaping new-born countries. 
Independence in 1960 
Loyalties to religion and ethnicity in newborn African countries are often more 
important than loyalty to the state, as the state was created not by Africans themselves, 
but by a foreign power. This was also the case in Nigeria (FaIola, 1998: 50). 
The end of colonial mle in 1960 strengthened the Muslim elite in creating an Islamic 
identity in modern Nigeria. Sir Ahmadu Bello, the Sardauna of Sokoto, the head of the 
Northern People's Congress was committed to the spread of Islam and the identification 
of Nigeria as a member of the Muslim world. A Nigerian umma has emerged, united by 
religion even though there were differences as to the interpretations of the Shari' ah and 
the Koran (FaIola, 1998: 29-30). Islamization in politics was mainly concentrated in the 
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Northem l\igeria, where most of Islamized Hausa people lived. With time, Nigerian 
Islamic parties started to include other ethnicities from southem parts of Nigeria. 
With the obvious creation of Islamic uml7la in Nigeria, Muslim world started to be 
concemed with the spread of Islam in the country. Many countries like Iran, Iraq, Saudi 
Arabia, and Libya started to supply Nigeria with books, teachers, missionaries, and 
money to support the development of Islam in Nigeria (FaIola, 1998: 30). These foreign 
contacts resulted in certain dependences from the sponsors that were influencing political 
decisions of Nigerian elites and actions of different religious movements. 
However, there were also divisions within the umma itself that were the effect of 
different political, economic, and social dynamics taking place in Nigeria and in the 
Muslim world. In many cases they were the results of different points of interest of 
certain charismatic leaders that were able to gather a t,lTeat deal of followers. An 
important division occurred between the tarzquas and orthodox movements. Those who 
were the participants of the tariquas were mainly from the old aristocratic families that 
included in Islam elements of traditional religions that counteracted with the fundaments 
of the orthodox Islam II. The leader of the holy war in the nineteenth century, Uthman dan 
Fodio, was a member of the Quadiriyya brotherhood that was present in north em Nigeria 
for the longest period and was considered as the official brotherhood in the region 
(Loimcir, 1997: 20). It was an order in which membership was exclusive to members 
from the local elite. It is with the presence of the second brotherhood, Tijaniyya, that the 
membership became accessible to the members of lower classes. Facing a danger of 
losing its influence, Quadiriyya refonned its rules. It changed the rule that salvation was 
possible only through intellectual effort. This regulation excluded masses, as the literacy 
II Like the belief in saints and recognition of the heads of the tariquas prophets and saints 
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among the lower class \Vas very low. Tijaniyya stated that salvation was possible through 
meditation and modesty that would result in the contact with saints. Those rules were also 
finally applied by the Quadiriyya brotherhood. The existence of two strong brotherhoods 
started the division in the umma. Prior to the emergence of Tijaniyya in Nigeria, 
Quadiriyya was responsible for the religious life of all Nigerian Muslims, and it 
controlled the eventual activities of ulamas that came from the outside of Hausa city-
states. However, when Tijaniyya started gaining members, both brotherhoods were more 
occupied fighting each other than taking care of the spiritual needs of their members and 
fulfilling their responsibilities in the regulations of religious activities. In the 1950s, the 
conflicts between Quadiriyya and Tijaniyya became so serious that the prime mmister of 
the Northern region, Sir Ahmadu Bello created Islamic Advisory Council that was 
supposed to solve and decrease religious tensions (Shedrack Best, 1999). 
Both Sufi brotherhoods have had close relations with successive regimes in Nigeria. 
Indeed .. the top rank of the leadership in both Sufi orders has benefited from the 
government in various ways. Unlike radical groups sllch as the Maitatsine, they seemed 
comfortable with the secular notion of the state and the idea of an Islamic state had a 
small popularity among their members. Also, brotherhoods themselves were not 
considered orthodox. There were many elements from traditional religions included in 
their beliefs and rituals. As such, they have been the targets of revivalist Islamic 
movements,. who tend to identify the Sufi orders with the state, and accuse them of moral 
bankruptcy and failure (Shedrack Best, 1999). 
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Preachers that did not seml0nize within the lines of mainstream Islam at that time 
began to have the opportunity to spread their activity as they were not controlled as much 
as before the "arrival" of the Tijaniyya. 
Another element that helped in the emergence of new religious movements was, once 
again after colonialism, the revival of the belief 111 the arrival of the mahdi (prophet). The 
end of the world was supposed to be "announced" by many natural disasters, wars, and 
many other misfortunes. As the economic situatIon after the independence \vas not good, 
Nigeria was experiencing droughts, floods, etc. it was obvious that some would identify 
those misfortunes with the coming end of the world as they were identified during 
colonial times. Those beliefs were used by many charismatic leaders who created their 
movement by announcing themselves to be the mahdi and giving proof of the close end 
of days. This is why Islam helped in the emergence of religious movements during 
difficult times. This is also one of the reasons \vhy Maitatsine managed to gain so many 
followers even though after the colonial administration was gone, many villages and 
ethnic groups went back to their traditional religions and custom law, (Pilaszewicz, 2000: 
227) as it was their choice, not an introduced administration or belief system. 
ECcQnomy and Islamic Fundamentalism 
Even though after colonialism private capItal remained insignificant, certain trends 
were already emerging. Nigerians were acquisitive, involving themselves either in high-
profit ventures (e.g., real estate, transportation, construction, or oil business) or in 
handling govemment resources. Enterprising Nigerians imitated the Europeans and the 
Lebanese in establishing factories and trading concerns. Those interested in the 
accumulation of capital recognized the opportunity oftcred by the transfer of power in the 
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1950s (emergence of federal system) and 1960s (independence). Civll servants, 
politicians, and businessmen became predators taking what they could from the state and 
using it to build capital, invest, and consume, not to budd a new state (FaIola, 1998: 52). 
The emergence of a federal system already in the 11 950s ensured regional autonomy, 
(where the Sokoto caliphate was the strongest region w·ith the loyalty toward Islam) 
distributed revenues broadly, and divided spheres of authority among regions in the 
federal government. This tripartite regional structure left Nigerian state unable to manage 
interregional relations and unable to stop the continuation of ethnic nationalisms (FaIola, 
1998: 52). 
Oil boom and bust, 1970-80 
In order to understand the popularity of fundamentalist Islamic movements we have 
to know what was happening in Nigerian economy, as those movements were related in 
large part with economic, political, and social dY11amics. 
After colonialism, Nigeria was left with an infrastructure that relied on production for 
export, especially cocoa and rubber, palm oil, and above all crude petroleum. The 
railroads were built only to pass plantations avoiding rural areas that would benefit local 
people facilitating the communication (Badru, 1998: 47). Big cities were growing, while 
rural areas were just exploited. 
When the oil was discovered in Nigeria in 1957, Nigeria became one of the biggest 
producers of oil in the world. The production was controlled by multinational 
corporations, such as Shell, BP, or Gulf Oil. They were supervised by Nigerian National 
Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) (Chazan, Lewis, Mortimer, 1999: 2(5). 
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After independence, in the 1960s, petroleum became the mam source of Nigerian 
income. Manufacture and the agricultural sectors of the economy have seriously declined. 
This agrarian decline could be seen in the increase of import of wheat grains, and 
decrease of income coming from the agriculture. For instance in 1956, agriculture 
consisted of 63% of Nigerian GDP, in ]980 this percent decreased to ]8% of the GDpl" 
(Badru., 1998: 49-51). Nigeria became totally dependent on the nuctuations of the 
imemational oil market. However, even though the production of the crude petroleum 
was significant, only a small part of the society was profiting from the 
governmental/national projects related to oil. Indeed, governmental spendings were 
mismanaged (Lubeck, 1981; Abdulraheem (et a1.), 1986; Osaghae, 1998), and the rest of 
the economy sectors were declining. Social disparities started to increase rapidly. 
During the Arab-Israeli vvar in the 1970s. the Arab countries' production of oil 
declined, which caused an increase of the need for petro] from other countncs. Thc prices 
of oil jumped significantly (Badru, 1998: 49). It was the beginning of the world oil boom 
from which Nigeria profited a great deal. During this time, the new elass that started 
emerging during colonial times, developed into a new bourgeoisie that was controlling 
the oil trade and that was profiting from it a great deal; most of them were related in some 
degree to govemment officials. They were also increasing the import of luxury products 
from the West, especially clothes, westem food, pop culture, etc. As Barkindo (1993) 
describes it: 
Many people heeame extremely rich and displayed their wealth by building fashionahle 
mansions, purchasing flashy cars and the latest electronic gadgets for their homes. and 
taking frequents trips abroad. Several Kano businessmen set a new fashion by buymg 
their own private jets. (Barkindo, 1993: 96). 
12 Source: Federal Ministry of Agriculture (1984). Information: Bulletin Oil Agriculture. Reproduced from 
Badm (1998). 
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On the other hand, even though Nigeria entered the path of quick industrial 
development, the amount of poor people was still increasing (Abdulraheem (et al.), 
1986). 
In 1970., after the Biafran Civil War, Nigeria was one of the poorest countries in the 
world, but after the oil boom it started to have more and more influences in the region. 
However, the policy of the government was very shortsighted. It was not directed toward 
the development of social security for the entire society. Also, the government was 
ignoring the private sector of the country that usually provokes the development of the 
society's wealth, more so than the public sector. In Nigeria, most of economic sectors 
were nationalized (Tidjani, 1998: 2). 
The accumulation of capital was 1I1creasll1g 111 1980s producing great amount of 
Nlgerian currency (Naira) on the market, which in turn, produced high inflation, and 
decrease of the value of the currency. The amount of local products significantly 
decreased with the increase of Western goods' import. Agriculture and manufacturing 
almost disappeared producing massive migrations from rural areas to cities for 
employment. It produced a situation, where cities became overcrowded. 
M any of those who migrated to cities could not find jobs and were joining the masses 
or unemployed Nigerians. Additionally, with the mcrease of Western influence the 
ordinary ulanws (Islamic scholars) and almajirai (Koranic students) were becoming more 
and more marginalized in big cities (Barkindo, 1993: 96). This was something that was 
not supposed to happen after lslamic education lJ . Finally, rural areas turned into places of 
11 A traditional system of education that was prestigious for its "graduates" especially for boys from rural 
areas joining a wondering malam (Islamic teacher). Boys were paying their ma/am with their work and 
begging for food (exercising zakkat). 
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extreme poverty while cities tumed into enclaves where people could encounter extreme 
wealth but also extreme misery. 
The assumption of national officials was that once the country becomes 
industrialized, rural areas would follow v·:ith economic transformation and development 
(Badru, 1998: 55). However, Western pop culture and other foreign and luxurious 
products were still visible only in main cities and became a sign of petrodollars that were 
accessible only to few. 
Even though there were no visible results of the govcrnment spending, large-scale 
projects existed as during the oil boom, filled with optimism Nigerian government started 
spending money that they borrowed from IMF, WB, and giant Western banks on large-
scale projects building freeways, airports, opcning programs in education, health care, 
and welfare services. In addition, all Western organizations were encouraging Nigeria to 
take loans, as they were also experiencing rapid development and had "petrodollars" to 
spend, loans were a form of good investments (Dos Santos, 1970). 
Examples of those large-scale projects arc national investments 111 rural areas that 
were mismanaged and not coordinated properly. They were only an excuse for officials to 
gain additional wealth for personal gain and were not carried with enough 
professionalism. For example, roads were built with inferior materials in wrong places 
(Chazan (et a1.), 1999: 265). The Green Revolution, which was initiated in early 1980s, 
only accelerated the decline of the rural areas. This .attempt at agricultural revitalization 
was led by members of the military that were not specialists in agriculture and they saw 
in these projects possibilities for quick enrichment (Badru, 1998: 55-56). 
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At the end of 1970s oil prices fell drastically (from $30 to $20 per barrel). Of course, 
it affected Nigeria significantly causing serious economIc and social crisis with national 
debt that surpassed gross domestic product. It was a heginning of the oil hust. However, 
the government reduced neither national nor the import spending. This resulted in the 
increase of government deficit and causing problems with the balance of payments. It 
was a beginning of giant national debts in international hanks (Forrest, 1988). The World 
Bank (WB) and International Monetary Fund (lMF) later used those debts as blackmail in 
order ftJr Nigeria to implement Structural Adjustment Programs (SAP). Nigeria was in a 
debt trap. 
In addition to the oil bust and increasing unemployment in cities and rural areas, 
Nigeria was experiencing rough droughts and desertification. This affected significantly 
already weak production of the agriculture seetor of the country (Forrest, 1988). A 
"rescue" programs were organized in mid-eighties under the name of Structural 
Adjustment Programs (SAP) instituted by IMF and WB. This was supposed to assure 
quick economic rebirth of the country. SAP forced several structural changes in the 
country subjected to the SAP that were called "conditionalities:" 
(1) Devaluation of local currency and the abolition of foreign exchange control 
(2) Anti-!l11flationary policies that called for the removal of subsidies on essential 
items including export of goods; control of bank lending and higher interest rates; 
elimination of price controls and minimum wages. 
(3) Reduction of state spending on social services (health, education, etc.) 
(4) Trade liberalization - open door policy for mvestments and import of foreign 
goods 
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(5) Privatization of public enterprises (parastatals) and sale of government shares in 
pnvate propeliies 
(6) Open door policy for multinational corporations (including free repatriation of 
accum ulated profi ts) 
(7) Control and reduction of wage rates 
(8) Raising of taxes 
SAPs were a rescue for international banks, not for developing countries. They 
resulted in t.he collapse of already weak educational sector, health care sector, and in the 
further fall in standard of living of the citizens. They did not resolve the problem of debts 
either (Dos Santos, 1970; Badru, 1998). 
Already after six years of independence, democratic Republic of Nigeria experienced 
its first military coup d'etat. from this time on. the military controlled the state l4 • Military 
regimes were controlhng civil liberties and political life in the country. The military 
imposed discipline was only superficial. The military changed its mandate to defend the 
nation to a mandate \vhose main function was to promote and protect the political and 
economic interests of a powerful group of officers As a result. ethnic clientele and 
corruption started to be very popUlar. The ruling class is divided along ethnic, regional, 
and religious lines (although crosscutting alliances happen to support interests of the 
elites). After the Biafran, Igbo - Hausa Civil War, most of those officers and presidents 
were Northern Muslim Fulani-Hausa people (Gordon, 2003: 183). 
I'· From the moment of independence in 1960 to 1999, first democratic elections, there was only 10 years of 
civil government, during the rest of the time Nigeria was ruled by the army 
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1{owever, with the military rule of Shehu Shagari (1979-1983) politicization of 
religion was forbidden. The result was the loss of control over religious life and 
politicization of the streets. Ideally, the goal was for every religion and ethnicity to live in 
peace and harmony, but very often, religious needs of society were exprcssed not in 
parliament but on the streets. As was said in earlier part of this chapter, Islam is not only 
a religion, but also an administrative and judicial system, and as such, it constitutes a 
political system. Being politically active, it is important for Muslims to havc at least some 
representation in the country's parliament. 
To enforce the ruling class, the military and the police forces were strengthened, new 
cquipment were bought. There was a tight relation between the police forces and ruling 
classes that was helpful during increasing signs of dissatisfaction with the government 
among the society. Because of corruption, lack of social support, health care, proper 
education, no civil liberties, and worsening of the economic situation in the country and 
increasing number of religious groups (Forrest, 1988: (5). The country was in turnloil. 
There was an obvious imbalance in the power relations between the state and Islamist 
movements. Given that the state, which has been under military rule for a long time, 
tended not to engage in any fonn of dialogue \\'ith perceived Islamic fundamentalists, the 
chances for confrontation increased. The state's response has been consistently to employ 
force (Shedrack Best 1999). 
Current situation (Western culture and Islam) 
Currently, tIle civilian government rules with the consent of the military. Everything 
looks as if Nigeria was on the right track to democracy and development of human rights 
and liberties. However, Nigeria is on the crossroad. In September 1999, Zamfara State 
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Governor introduced the penal code of Shari'ah in Northern Nigeria. Subsequently eight 
other northern slates followed (Gordon, 2003: 217) even though, as one of the leading 
Nigerian newspapers wrote: 
Punishments sllch as stoning. floggll1g or amputation are considered cruel, inhuman and 
degrading tl'eatment by international human rights standards. By ratifying the Convention 
Against torture in June 2001, the Federal Republic of Nigeria has decided to bind itself 
not to apply sllch punishments. Sll1ce 2000. amputation and flogging have been carried 
out in several states of northem Nigeria (Nigeria Today, 20(2). 
Nevertheles, there liS a growing concern among other religious groups in the North 
and South on this law that is shaking Nigeria to its foundation. The president, Olusegun 
Obasanjo, who is a Christian Yoruba is against introducing the Shari 'ah in the entire 
country. Ironically, Obasanjo was the one \vho approved Shari 'ah law when he was 
president under military rule in the late 1970s. Today, Obasanjo says Shari'ah is illegal 
but has done nothing more than opposing Shari' ah punishments when confronted by the 
international media during his international trips. Nevertheless, the tensions are growing, 
both in the country and abroad as Nigeria is subjected to pressures from the international 
community to solve the "problem with the Islamic Jaw." For instance, recent stoning of 
several women in Northern Nigeria that were accused of adultery for being pregnant 
without having a husband, or having sexual relations out of wedlock brought Nigeria 
negative press. Most known cases that kept international attention were those of Ms. 
LawaI and Safiya Hussaini. 
At the same time, large number of radical IslamlC movements and groups emerged, 
groups like Jiamatu Nasril Islam (JNI), Zamfara State Vigilante Group, Ja'amutu Tajdimul 
Islami (Movement for Islamic Revival), and many others that are supporting the 
introduction of the Shari'ah as the official Jaw in Northern Nigeria. These are the voices 
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that are against westcmizatIon of social li fe and acceptance of another fCllTI1 of social, 
political, and economic stmcture for Nigeria. 
On the other hand there are also protests against thc effects of globalization on 
Nigeria that is described as a fornl of nco-colonialism. Those are secular protests and 
have nothing to do with religion but go along with the protests against further impact of 
West on Nigeria. Nigerian Labor Congress (NLC) organized series of meetings about the 
poverty in Nigerian society. The president of the NLC, Adams Oshiomholc accuses 
international community that it is helping Nigeria but not in reducing poverty but in 
"managing'" it. His claim is to "create \\caIth, not manage poverty"(Komolafe, 2002). 
Will all religions in Nigeria start working together? Will different ethnicities 
come up with a compromise and agreement how to live together, or will Nigeria split 
along one of the fragmentation lines? Will civil liberties be respected in Nigeria? Will the 
anti-globalization protests work? There are many questions that do not have an answer 
yet. But wc live in transition period of the history that leads to some change and maybe 
we will be still here to witness it. 
Islam, as religion, administrative system, and system of nornlS and vaJues has a 
significant capacity to integrate groups and building quite powerful states, such as 
Kanem-Bornu, Mansa Musa's Mali, Askia'a Songhay, or Sokoto Caliphate. However, it 
has also power to destroy current stable systems and introduce chaos and instability, as it 
is the case with several fundamentalist religious movements that is the subject of this 
work. 
As for now, it is important to know the answers that we can get from analyzing 
the history .. The question is, why those religious fundamentalist movements are needed in 
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the society and, as a result, so accepted and their ideas so fast intemalized? And why are 
people tended to be attracted to fundamentalist forms of religion? Is it the only way to 
counteract globalization or nco-colonialism? 
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CHAPTER V 
FUNDMANENTALIST RELIGIOUS MOVEMENTS IN NIGERIA 
In modem times, when changes that emerged with colonialism were the triggers 
that led to the decomposition of traditional social structures, Islam became the element of 
reintegration. It was a reintegration not only of people that experienced war or other 
disasters, but also of individuals that were tom apart from their families, roots, and 
hometowns (Pilaszewicz, 2000: 226). People experiencing spiritual crisis and 
disappointment with capitalism tum to an alternative way that the religion ofIslam offers. 
It is a search for a perfect social and political structure. Nowadays, one can observe an 
intriguing turnover of tendencies; the number of orthodox or even fundamentalist l 
religious movements' supporters seems to increase (Pawlak, 2003). It is a result of raising 
doubts by nations that are subjected to globalization, doubts about Western values and 
norms that are so much related to globalization. As a Saudi Arabian ambassador, Prince 
Bandar Ibn Sultan stated: "Foreign imports are nice and shiny or they are high tech 
"things." But foreign intangible social and political institutions can be deadly" (Barber: 
2001,206). 
This thesis aims at developing a theoretical approach analyzing the reasons for the 
emergence of fundamentalist religious movements. It is a case study, where one 
movement will be analyzed, a movement called Maitatsine that operated in Northern 
1 We distinguish in this thesis orthodoxy from fundamentalism: orthodox movements operate within the 
non-Islamic system, while fundamentalist movements reject any non-Islamic systems. For more look 
Chapter 1. 
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Nigeria with its apogee of popularity during 1970s - 1980s. This chapter will present an 
analysis of this movement that will be conducted using the theoretical model developed 
in second chapter that uses concepts of international division of labor, framing and 
mobilization process of the social movements, hegemony, and counter hegemony. 
As this study is a historical analysis, it will be based on the examination of 
historical events related to Maitatsine presented in secondary and primary sources. The 
history of Maitatsine movement is very closely related to the history of Nigeria and the 
history of Islam in West Africa, this is why during the analysis there will be references to 
the first chapter of this work where the history of Nigeria and the history ofIslam in West 
Africa were discussed. In this thesis only one movement will be analyzed, even though, 
many other religious fundamentalist movements tend to have similar patterns. The reader 
has to remember though that not all the orthodox religious movements are 
fundamentalist, and as such, not eligible for the analysis proposed in this work. The 
movement that is the subject of this analysis is a revolutionary movement against the 
current political, economic, and social system present in the country of the movement's 
activity or in the entire secular world. The fundamentalist movements argue for the 
change of the capitalist system. Their goal is to change the system in order to introduce a 
new one, based on their preferred religion, Islam, especially the core principles of the 
Shari'ah law. In order to show the differentiation in the Islamic religious movements in 
Nigeria, several other movements, other than Maitatsine, will be shortly presented in the 
next section. 
In the analysis of the Islamic religious movement, fundamentalist, orthodox, or 
liberal ones, one has to know and remember that all the movements have wide latitude in 
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their interpretation of the Koran and the Sunna, and as such, there are no significant 
barriers in the ideology developed by those movements. The reason for it is the fact that 
Islamic authority is not unified. There is no institution that would dictate to the Islamic 
umma of the entire world the only valid interpretation of the Koran and Sunna including 
rules, values, and norms of behavior like it is the case with Christian's Vatican and the 
person of pope, who is the highest authority in the Christian world. Islamic scholars or 
religious authorities can only give fa twa ( advice) (Pawlak, 2003: 156). 
Islamic Brotherhoods (orders/tariquas) 
In Islam, there are two main approaches to religious life. One is based on 
interpretations of the Koran and Sunna that are applied to life directly. This approach is 
used by the uiamas, qadi, and theologists. The second approach is represented by the Sufi 
brotherhoods that are based on the Islamic mysticism. It is characterized by the 
importance of spiritual life leading to the unification with God. Execution of religious 
rules is the first step in the path to the unification. It is a very hierarchical structure with 
leaders of the brotherhood at the top. The leaders are consecrated with the baraka, a 
divine blessing, which allows them to have visions where they see the future and the 
supernatural world. The brotherhoods leaders were considered saints and were cherished 
after their death. Their main occupation was, through their work, to plead God for the 
salvation for "ordinary" people. With the spread of Islam before and after colonialism, 
brotherhoods took over the role of traditional authorities: promoting agriculture in the 
countryside, securing social needs to people, and were the connection between the 
state/colonial authority and the population (Christelow, 1985: 379). Originally, they 
focused on simple life, modesty, simplicity, and altruism of Mohammed. However, 
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during colonialism they were made part of the native authority. After independence, 
brotherhood started to be active in politics of Nigeria (and other states as well). In West 
Africa, two brotherhoods gained the most popularity: Tijaniyya and Qadiriyya. Qadiriyya 
was originally an elitist order, accepting only people with Koranic education and from 
"respected" families. Tijaniyya was a more populist brotherhood gaining more members 
and becoming a political thereat to Quadiriyya. It fired up a conflict that was presented 
chapter 3. The important thing to notice here is that brotherhoods are blended into the 
secular system. They have seats in political institutions, and often do not have much in 
common with the lower class of the society. However, they are among the most liberal 
religious Islamic organizations in Nigeria. 
'Van Izala 
'Van Izala is the name of members of the religious movement called Gama'at 
Izalat al Bid'a wa Iqamat as-Sunna in Arabic meaning "Organization for the Fight 
against Innovations and for the Strengthening of the Faith." It is an Islamic movement 
based on the rules of Wahabbism3. It was established in 1978 by Ismail Idris, but its 
spiritual foundator was Abubakar Gumi, a politician and ulama and a professor at the 
University Bayero in Kano. He was an important figure of the organization lama 'atu 
Nasril Islam (The Community of Islamic Triumph) that was a significant Islamic 
educational organization founded in 1961, just after Nigeria gained independence. It was 
concerned with establishing modem Islamic schools (lslamiyya Schools) where qualified 
2 For more reference look in: Loimeier (1997) 
3 Wahabbism was originated by Ibn Abd Al Wahhab in 17th century. It calls for the return to the origins of 
Islam and rejection of all the innovations and new interpretations of the Koran. It rejects the belief in saints 
and related to it mysticism as derivations of polytheism. It calls for jihad. 
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teachers taught Arabic language, Islamic knowledge, arithmetic, Rausa, and English 
(Coulon, 1993: 129). 
The development of 'Yan Izala was related to political events in Nigeria. Its 
popularity increased when the government forbade the existence of political parties. 
During this period the only way to express political views by the youngsters was through 
political religious organizations. During the presidential candidacy of Shehu Shagari 
(1979-1983), who was a Muslim, 'Yan Izala intensified their activity as Abubakar Gumi 
supported the president, and as a result, the 'Yan Izala movement gained a strong support 
from the government. During this time, 'Y an Izala started to use more radical methods in 
their fight for the purity of Islam. Their ideology was basically directed against the 
Islamic brotherhoods as 'Yan Izala rejected mysticism, the belief in saints, construction 
of mosques on saint's graves, and miracles that brotherhoods' leaders were capable of, all 
of which were part of the Sufi's ideology (Loimeier, 1997: 229-231). 
Additionally, 'Yan Izala were sponsored by Kuwait and Saudi Arabia that were 
interested in spreading Wahabbism in West Africa, which meant significant supplies of 
financial support. The financial support led to the development of a significant number of 
Islamic schools for adult men and women in Northern Nigeria. 
'Yan Izala is an example of an orthodox movement that was operating within the 
political system of the country, and tried to find a way to argue for their ideology through 
the secular system. 
The "Shiite" movement 
The Shiite movement is another Islamic political fundamentalist organization with 
its origins located at university campuses. It originated with Yahaya Al Zakazaki, former 
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student of Ahmadu Bello University in Zaria. During his studies, Zakzaki founded 
Muslim Student's Society that had a very radical ideology and was often the cause of 
brutal disturbances and demonstrations. 
The movement is incorrectly called by journalists as the Shiite movement. Their 
roots are strictly Sunni, and the only link with the Shiite Islam is the funding and training 
that the movement was receiving from Iran, a Shiite state. Zakzaki with others members 
of the Shiite movement were often guests at conferences in Iran about Islamic rhetoric 
and revolution. However, with the changes in Iranian politics in 1990s, the Shiite 
movement decreased significantly its activity. 
The ideology of this movement opposes state authority, secular judicial system, 
and Nigerian constitution. They are also against the Nigerian anthem, and Nigerian 
national flag (Shedrack Best, 1999). Its ideology is the closest to the one of Maitatsine. 
However, its members originated mostly from universities in Northern Nigeria, as 
opposed to the working class or unemployed members of the Maitatsine movement. 
The Shiite movement can be considered an Islamic fundamentalist 
religious movement, even though its members' past was related to the state institutions 
that they were using during trials in secular court (Shedrack Best, 1999). However, they 
were protesting against the secular state, and for the establishment of the state based on 
the Shari'ah law. 
There are several other religious groups that emerged in late 1980s. They are 
mainly student organizations led by matured Islamic ulamas that are expressing their 
dissatisfaction from the politics of the state authority and the economic and political 
direction that the state is undertaking. However, all those movements, even though they 
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are orthodox, I would not call them fundamentalist, as they are operating within the 
political system of the country. The movement that will be analyzed in this thesis 
nevertheless is a fundamentalist movement that opposed the political, economic, and 
cultural system of Nigeria and did not want to tolerate any compromise with the capitalist 
secular political, economic, and cultural system. It is a war over values, culture, and 
institutions that make up each society. 
Structural conditions for the rise of the Maitatsine movement 
The fact that Muhammadu Marwa alias Maitatsine managed to create such an 
influential fundamentalist movement was not only his merit. One would say that along 
with his charismatic talents and religious attitudes, he came to the right place at the right 
moment. Situating Maitatsine's movement in the economic, and political reality of the 
historical period the movement began clearly show the external dynamics that led to the 
significant popularity of Maitatsine's movement in Northern Nigeria. They are related to 
the neocolonial economic exploitation of Nigeria by the West along with multinational 
corporations. Muhammadu Marwa started gathering his disciples in the period of the oil 
boom at the beginnings of the 1970s. The peak of the popUlarity of his movement can be 
dated from 1980 to 1985 when Nigeria was experiencing the oil bust. So, his activity was 
taking place during the period of transition and instability in Nigeria. In the 1970s' oil 
boom, when petroleum became the main source of Nigerian income, and the economy 
started to improve, Nigeria had a chance to enter the path of progress in the hierarchy of 
international division of labor, to become a semi periphery instead of remaining a 
periphery state by Wallerstein's (1979, 1980) model of world stratification. Cities opened 
to increased employment pulling large numbers of immigrants. The role of Nigeria in the 
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region started to increase, and its military power started to be significant. However, even 
though the production of the crude petroleum was significant, only a small part of the 
society was profiting from the governmental/national projects related to oil as the 
revenues were divided only among the triple alliance formed by the military regime, new 
bourgeoisie, and the multinational corporations (Evans, 1979). Indeed, governmental 
spendings were mismanaged (Lubeck, 1981; Abdulraheem (et al.), 1986; Osaghae, 1998), 
and the rest of the economy sectors were declining, as all the national successful projects 
were directed only toward the oil industry. Social disparities started to increase rapidly 
with the raising amount of poor people (Abdulraheem (et al.), 1986). 
One can observe this historic period in Nigeria, as process of attaining the next level 
on the world stratification ladder that was mismanaged by the shortsighted policy making 
of the State and its relations with the multinational corporations, and the new bourgeoisie 
in the oil business. Oil businesses, controlled largely by the multinational corporations, 
showed the continuation of exploitation and expropriation of raw resources of the 
peripheral Nigeria by the core countries/multinational corporations, like in colonial times. 
With the entry of multinational corporations, Western culture became widespread with 
the increasing import of products from the West, especially clothes, western food, pop 
culture, etc. Barkindo (1993). Western culture coupled with the capitalist system was 
introducing another system of domination apart from the economic domination: a cultural 
domination. One can see in this cultural domination Adorno's culture industry hegemony 
(Adorno, 2002-1). In addition, all Western organizations were encouraging Nigeria to 
take loans, as they were also experiencing rapid development and had "petrodollars" to 
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spend, loans were a fonn of good investments, and at the same time, they were increasing 
Nigerian dependence (Dos Santos, 1970). 
Also, due to the political situation, Nigeria, being a developing country made it easier 
for Maitatsine to develop, as its social and administrative institutions were not very well 
developed. The lack of registration of citizens, corruption, and decentralization caused 
that the state institutions were not very effective in keeping an order in the country. This 
is when it was easy for an opposition to emerge. With growing disparities, where most 
wealth was in hands of local elites cooperating with multinational corporations, the 
ideology, combined with hard economic conditions, chaos in religious administration, 
and invasion of foreign Western culture resulted in the emergence of a powerful 
fundamentalist religious movement called Maitatsine. Its ideology was against the ruling 
elites and the domination of the West. 
When the amount of local products significantly decreased with the increase of 
Western goods' import and agriculture and manufacturing almost disappeared, for the 
Nigerian population it meant massive migrations from rural areas to cities for 
employment. It produced a situation, where cities became overcrowded with the 
increasing number of unemployed and displaced people. But the number of immigrants 
was still increasing as the cities constituted a promise for a better life: American movies 
about success, good cars, shops full of products to buy, nice houses, everything around 
was pulling people into the cities reassuring them that Western consumers goods and 
culture will provide all the elements necessary for happiness. This is how culture 
hegemony was blinding the immigrants. 
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Additionally, with the increase of Western influence the lesser ulamas (Islamic 
scholars) and almajirai (Koranic students) were becoming more and more marginalized 
in big cities. It was a result of the increased migration of ulamas and almajirai into the 
cities, and also they were being often replaced in primary schools with secular teachers 
(Barkin do, 1993: 96). This was something that was not supposed to happen to ulamas and 
almajirai after Islamic education4 in countries where Islam has almost a status of national 
religion. Finally, rural areas turned into places of extreme poverty while cities turned into 
enclaves where people could encounter extreme wealth but also extreme misery. 
Muhammadu Marwa had a fertile ground in people ready to follow a charismatic leader 
that would direct their disappointment with western culture that was really unattainable 
for them. There were many people disillusioned, acknowledging the lack of opportunities 
for them and at the same time the experiencing the pain from the observation of the 
extreme wealth and mirages of the "American" dream in television and commercials on 
the streets that had to remain a dream for the unemployed immigrants . .As Maitatsine 
delivered public sermons, at first many people only listened, still believing that they can 
make it in the culture industry system. However, with time, and no success, no good job, 
the number of Maitatsine's disciples was increasing. 
We have described in details how external factors like the international division of 
labor with its dynamics in the world economy and politics influenced the events on the 
national level, i.e. demographic migrations, increasing disparities in the cities, and 
poverty. The fact that Nigeria is a periphery, and was/still is dependent upon the world oil 
4 A traditional system of education that was prestigious for its "graduates" especially for boys from rural 
areas was joining a wondering malam (Islamic teacher) and walk with him from city to city and listening to 
ma/am's lessons. Boys were paying their malam with their work and begging for food (exercising zakkat). 
After the "graduation" they could become themselves malams, be respected, and improve their living 
conditions by opening a Koranic school in their home town or becoming member of he town's conci!. 
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market led to the increase in demographic migrations in the country leading in turn to the 
increase of the population in the city, population that was not able to get a job, so it 
joined the masses of unemployed groups that were a fertile ground for fundamentalist 
religious movements like Maitatsine. 
The Charismatic leader 
Muhammadu Marwa was born in 19205 in Jappai near Marwa in Northern Cameroon. 
He was a member of the Mofu ethnic group, which was part of the "pagan" group of 
Kirdi peoples. This group was known for their manufacture of iron products and for their 
knowledge of herbs, magic, and production of amulets. Marwa also mastered this 
knowledge, which was useful to him as the leader of the Maitatsine movement 
(Christelow, 1985: 383). 
Until the 19th century Mofu lived in the mountains. However, with French 
colonization, their policy of land administration, and severe hunger in 1931, the Mofu 
had to leave the mountains and undertake the practice of the agriculture at meadows. 
Muhammadu Marwa was among this migration wave. When Muhammadu was 16, he left 
his family and went to Marwa in Cameroon. Because of the high status of Islam in West 
Africa. As the Mufu ethnic group was cherishing traditional religions, their status among 
other ethnic groups was very low. Marwa, who did not want to be laughed at, and wanted 
to be respected, converted to Islam. Many of his disciples later on also were joining 
Marwa in order to get respect, as they were the immigrants from distinct ethnic groups in 
the city. This is where we see that Islam and participation in Islamic religious groups 
could help. Islam was the integrating' element, and an element that was able to increase 
ones social status. 
5 However, in his passport, his birthday is in 1927. 
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Marwa's later ideology was influenced by the fact that he was brought in social 
mobility up in the region where mahdist traditions were alive. It was a region where 
Hayatu Ibn Sa'id, member of the Sokoto royal family and a member of the mahdist 
uprising in Sudan established his camp (Christelow, 1985: 380). In his teachings, Marwa 
called himself a mahdi, he was supposed to be the last prophet himself. When he lived in 
Marwa, he worked for a Muslim named Mohammed Arab, who taught him how to read 
and interpret the Koran. Even though he knew how to read, and even though he was a 
Muslim already, everybody in Marwa knew that Muhammadu Marwa was from the Mufu 
group, and thus nobody was respecting him (Zahradeen, 1983l This made Muhammadu 
Marwa leave Cameroon and travel to Nigeria. He came to Kano in 1945, as Christelow 
(1985: 383) states, or in 1955, as Zahradeen states (1983: 19). Kano was at that time the 
biggest trade and industrial center in the region, as well as the transportation center 
(Lubeck, 1981: 31). It was inhabited mainly by Muslims and by people with strong 
connections with the West because of the trade relations. 
In early 1960s Marwa started delivering public sermons offending wealthy Hausa 
people (Zahradeen, 1983). Because of his sermons he was arrested several times and put 
in prison for a couple of months; first, in 1962 for three months, second in 1974 for a 
year7, and then in 1978 for sermons against the state authority. After his last arrest, he 
was never seen again preaching publicly. Instead, he was sending his disciples to do it for 
him. Between 1962 and 1978 Muhammadu Marwa was expelled from Nigeria several 
times but he was always getting back. Even though he was not popular among the Kano 
elite or among the authority (that was close to the elite) his popularity among immigrants 
6 All the details about Muhammadu Marwa come from the Zahradeen book. 
7 Even though he was sentenced for 10 years. However, after a year of prison, the government changed and 
the new president, Murtala Muhammad, announced amnesty for the prisoners. 
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and lower class was increasing. His house became a guarded fortress, and Marwa started 
to be accompanied always by two bodyguards. 
Marwa's income came from his magical and herbal knowledge - he was providing 
services to those who were able to pay for the service (healing, projecting the future, 
etc.), and from the money that his disciples were bringing to him8. They were getting the 
money from begging on the streets9. 
Muhammadu Marwa was preaching in Hausa, as Hausa language was a vehicular 
means of communication in Kano. However, Marwa was not a Hausa and he never 
learned how to speak Hausa fluently, he was speaking the "dirty" Hausa, called 
gwaranci, so the Hausa language spoken by the other than Hausa ethnic groups 
(Pilaszewicz, 1995: 28). It was a derogatory name. Based on the language mistakes that 
Marwa was committing in his sermons by speaking Hausa, his nickname Maitatsine 
emergedlO. Marwa used to often repeat one sentence: "The one who does not listen, God 
will curse." However, it was consistently repeated with a big mistake, that was saying 
that God was a woman, which of course could not be possible. Marwa was saying Wanda 
ba ta yarda ba Allah ta tsine whereas it should have been Wanda bai yarda ba Allah ya 
tsine. Based on this sentence he was called Maitatsine: "the one who curses," but this 
"one" was a woman, which was derogatory as well. But, his language problems were the 
reason why Marwa had so much popularity among the immigrants; they knew that he was 
one of them and that he understood them. And as the immigrants were very numerous in 
8 Based on the traditional relationship between the ulama and almajirai (disciples), the disciples were 
obliged to provide payment for their teacher. 
9 Giving money to the needing ones is one of the pillars oflslam, so the disciples did not have any 
problems in getting the money from people, as Kano was inhabited mainly by Muslims 
10 Muhamrnadu Marwa had also other nicknames, less popular, like Muhammadu Arab, Muhammadu 
Jabbi, Muhammadu Darka, Muhammadu Mai Tabsiri, or Muhammadu Garka (FaIola, 1998: 141). 
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Kano during the time of the oil boom, and then bust, Maitatsine's fundamentalist 
religious group gained a significant popularity and had a great men power. 
The life of Maitatsine ended rapidly. He died during the first series of riots that he 
caused. The first riots were directly originated by a letter sent by the governor of Kano, 
Abubakar Rimi to Maitatsine asking him to remove all the constructions that he and his 
disciples built illegally in the 'Y an A waki neighborhood that was occupied entirely by 
the 'Yan Tatsine. Primary school that was in this neighborhood was transformed by the 
movement to an additional sleeping place for the members of the movement. All the 
residents of this neighborhood that were not members of Maitatsine movement were 
forced to move out, and if they were unwilling to do so, 'Yan Tatsine were using force in 
order to make them to leave, even some smaller disturbances were provoked during the 
"moving" sessions when few people were killed. Governor Rimi was receiving many 
complaints from the displaced residents. However, as Maitatsine was taking care of large 
parts of the unemployed social groups in Kano and it was shown that many official were 
bribed by Maitatsine, the movement and Maitatsine himself were left alone. Also, some 
officials were using Maitatsine's magical services (Nicolas, 1981: 63). So, nothing was 
done until Maitatsine and his disciples have built some simple constructions (it would be 
too much to call them "buildings") to accommodate even more 'Yan Tatsine in the 'Yan 
Awaki neighborhood and did not ask for the permission of the city. 
Muhammadu Marwa died 27th of December 1980. Soldiers then cremated his body 
and spread ashes near his grave in Yanguza village near Kano, or in Ringiyar Zaki 
(Christelow, 1985). This act was supposed to avoid pilgrimages of his disciples to his 
grave, which could have provoked further riots (riots did not stop anyway until 1985). 
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After this event, all of his disciples were forced to escape from the 'Yan Awaki 
neighborhood where the Maitatsine movement was located. The life of Muhammadu 
Marwa alias Maitatsine was over, but the Maitatsine fundamentalist religious movement 
continued to exist and the riots spread to the entire Northern Nigeria. 
The riots that started when Marwa was still alive lasted nine days, from the 20th to the 
29th of December. The police could not pacify them. It is the army, sent to help the police 
on the 28th, which managed to take the control over the dissatisfied mob. After those nine 
days of disturbances, 4,177 people were declared dead (Zahradeen, 1988). However, 
Maitatsine riots were not over. They started again in October of 1982 in Bulumkutu, near 
Maiduguri in the state of Borno, and in Kaduna and Rigasa, then in February of 1984 in 
Y ola. Last significant Maitatsine riots took place in April of 1985 in Gombe (Isichei, 
1987; Hiskett, 1987; Pilaszewicz, 1955; Zahradeen, 1983,1988). 
Mobilization 
Maitatsine based his ideology on the displaced people. It was movement of the 
"disinherited" as Elisabeth Isichei (1987) called it. They were the disinherited from their 
hometown, as they were immigrants, and disinherited from the city, as they could not 
find any work that would realize their dreams of wealth and consumer goods that were so 
present in the city of Kano. In 1980 the number of Maitatsine disciples was estimated as 
6-10 thousand people (sic!), and 80% of them came from other cities than Kano, 20% of 
his disciples were foreigners 11 (Report of the Tribunal of Inquiry on Kano Disturbances: 
24). The immigrants came to Kano from different countries like Ghana, Niger, Benin, 
Chad, Togo, Ivory Coast, and like Maitatsine himself Cameroon (Bentsi-Enchill, 1983: 
II It was difficult to establish the exact number of the 'Yan Tatsine as many of them did not have any 
identification documents. 
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245). Another group that was vulnerable were the seasonal immigrants migrating to big 
cities during dry seasons to earn some money, as there was no work during this period in 
the countryside. They were called the 'yan cin rani (those who eat during the dry season) 
(Christelow, 1985: 213). Part of his disciples constituted also young Koranic students, 
almajirai, who treated Maitatsine as their mentor. When Maitatsine stopped showing up 
in public after his third arrest, his almajirai took over the public sermons and the 
recruitment process. They were lost, poor and already knew that there are not many 
possibilities for them to get a job, however they were saw wealth around them and the 
Western culture associated with money. Marwa provided them with psychological and 
material support and showed them a way to direct their anger. 
Depicting Maitatsine' s disciples shows clearly that all three functions of social 
movements: diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational suggested by David Snow and 
Robert Benford (1988, 1992) were granted. People that were joining Maitatsine already 
felt some degree of dissatisfaction resulted from their economic position in the society, as 
that they could not find any good job as they were expecting arriving to Kano. It was not 
difficult for Marwa to persuade his followers that there is something wrong going on for 
them, as his ideology was aligned between what his audience already knew, felt, or had 
experienced; his ideology covered familiar ground. This is how he "fulfilled" the 
diagnostic function of the social movement. Also, with the use of the authority of Islam 
and adequate interpretations, Marwa was able to show his disciples a solution to their 
problems, which included following the path of Islam, basically meaning to follow his 
word as he claimed to be the next prophet. The followers, thanks to Maitatsine's charisma 
and the authority of Islam felt that Marwa knew how to "fix" the situation and how to 
84 
provide them with answers and solutions, they felt that the best thing that they could do 
was to follow Maitatsine, as he was the next prophet. This is how both prognostic and 
motivational functions were also fulfilled. 
Maitatsine recruited his followers from railway stations and bus stations where young 
people were arriving from the countryside or other countries and staying there, as they 
had nowhere else to go. He, an later his trained disciples were delivering public sermons 
getting attention from those who were frustrated with social inequalities, unequal 
distribution of wealth in the city and lack of opportunities for the gardawa ("ordinary" 
people). An individual, migrating from home in the countryside toward the city where 
he/she was encountering a dazzling consumerist culture from the West but is not able to 
reach it and grab it experienced a crisis - ideological, moral, existential, and material one. 
The collapse of the traditional structures and beliefs was often leading to find a new 
identity in Islam that was giving an opportunity to reintegrate to a social movement that 
was providing prestige related to religion, prestige that otherwise would be unattainable 
(Pilaszewicz, 2000: 226). This is the moment when the grievance and dissatisfaction of 
immigrants was emerging. This was the moment when the immigrants, future 
Maitatsine's disciples were ready to enter a social movement, that in this case, was a 
fundamentalist religious movement and internalize a new counter hegemony of religious 
fundamentalism. 
In Islamic fundamentalist religious movements, religious solidarity and common 
purpose is set, in most of the cases, by the leaders of these movements. Maitatsine, as the 
leader of the movement created a point of reference for his disciples that were often 
people without any chances of success in life, and without any material property. He first 
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provided them with food, shelter, and psychological support. They found in the 
movement psychological and material shelter, support, and a feeling of security (Hiskett 
1987, Isichei 1987, Pilaszewicz 1995). Those were the first steps of framing: ideological, 
psychological, and material support. Marwa formed the agency and identity present in 
social movements, relating his ideology to Islam, and using the strong feeling of 
grievance among the "disinherited." 
The Role of the State 
Movements like Maitatsine oppose with their counter hegemony the state authority 
and foreign hegemony, but they also replace the state in social support, when national 
social institutions are weak or hardly function or exist. In Nigeria, even though state 
resembled the bureaucratic-authoritarian state, which was part of the triple alliance. 
However, with weak civil society, weak private sector, the state was unable to push the 
country toward further development of social support and infrastructure. In this respect, 
Nigerian state can be viewed as weak. For example, one of the arguments put forward to 
explain why the Nigerian government did not do anything to stop the activity of 
Maitatsine was that this religious movement took care of the problem of unemployed 
immigrants in the cities, however, as the events showed not for long and with unwanted 
consequences (Christelow 1985). We can see here the role of the state increasing the 
popularity of Maitatsine. Because of the fact that the government had weak social 
institutions, related and concerned only with the bourgeoisie, other alternatives had to 
emerge. A taxi driver, asked why people join Islamic fundamentalists answered: 
When people are treated like animals, social institutions are corrupted, one can get 
arrested for nothing, get bitten for nothing it would be enough to tell people where the 
Fundamentalists are located and many would follow them (Pawlak, 2003: 153). 
It follows what a sociologist, Donald Crumsey (1970) said: 
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For popular violence arises in situations, where states claim a monopoly on the legitimate 
use of violence and direct it against the people. Most popular violence is a response to 
state or ruling-class violence (Crurnsey, 1970: 1). 
By filling up the gap of social support for the groups of unemployed in the city of 
Kano and supporting it with oppositional religious ideology, Maitatsine created a very 
strong and dangerous social movement for the city authorities. It had a very strong 
mobilization model (Tilly, 1978), as social movements theorists would see it. It had a 
very strong organization with a very strong collective identity based on religious ideology 
and common experiences of deprivation and strong feelings of grievance. Islam, having a 
hierarchical structure enabled it to create such a construction of the Maitatsine movement 
that was able to mobilize resources under the form of disciples in very structured and 
effective way. Maitatsine's disciples were giving public sermons that were part of the 
recruitment process. They were also providing shelter, food, and psychological support to 
new potential 'Yan Tatsine (disciples of Maitatsine). Maitatsine with all his disciples 
were living in a neighborhood in Kano called 'Yan Awaki. In 1979 (the peak of its 
popularity was in 1980) the entire neighborhood, couple of blocks, was occupied by the 
'Yan Tatsine. Also, thanks to the structure of the relationship between the teacher and 
student in Islam, Maitatsine did not have to worry about the financial resources of his 
movement, his disciples had to provide him, as the teacher with financial support for his 
mentoring and teachings. The disciples, as it was mentioned, were getting the money 
from begging on the streets, and from part time jobs that they were able to find. All the 
riots that were caused by Maitatsine proved that the movement was very strong, and well 
organized. Also, with the rule of Shehu Shagari (1979-1983) politicization of religion 
was forbidden. The result of this decision was the loss of control over religious life and 
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politicization of the streets. Finally, with the increasing population in Kano, umegulated 
laws about preachers, what they were allowed and not allowed to do or preach, 
Maitatsine movement had all the political, economic, social opportunities to become a 
strong social movement that many other social movements never had. 
Resistance 
Maitatsine's ideology, based on Islamic fundamentalism, was a counter 
hegemony that fought against the domination of the West and related to the West local 
elites. He saw the economic domination of the West, but also the culture industry that 
expanded in the non-western countries. As a revolutionary movement, Maitatsine wanted 
to break the domination of the self by following the strict rules of religion and not those 
of capitalist profit making system. And finally, he wanted to break the economic 
domination of the West by attacking and destroying their symbols (cars, watches, plastic 
products), strategic buildings (police stations, town hall) and by constituting their own 
public and administrative system. Maitatsine wanted to break all three modes of 
domination distinguished by Theodor Adorno and Max Horkeheimer (2002a): social 
domination, internal domination, and domination of nature. 
Maitatsine was also against the Islamic Sufi brotherhoods as they were part of the 
corrupted system and did not practice the "true" Islam by the fact that they worshipped 
saints, which is part of the traditional African beliefs (Islam however is also based on 
traditional nomadic beliefs and customs). The attitude of 'Yan tatsine toward the tariquas 
was the fact that the riots in 1980 started two days before the anniversary of the Tijaniyya 
founder, one of the main tariquas in Kano, Sidi Ahmad Al Tijani. The celebrations of this 
anniversary constitute an important event in the Tijanniya religious calendar (Christelow, 
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1985: 376). The tariquas were identified with the state authority that in tum was related to 
the West, and as such they were part of the system that needed to be boycotted by 
Maitatsine. And Muhammadu Marwa was attacking, in his sermons, literally everything 
that was part of Western culture including watches, bikes, tobacco, and even plastic bags 
(Christelow, 1987: 217-221). A Hausa newspaper, Maganar Kana (The Kano Voice) was 
. 12 
reportmg : 
When they were preaching, they were repeating all the time that every Muslim in the city 
must get rid of watches, glasses, or any jewelry. They claimed that Muslims should not 
travel by plane or carry more than 10 Naira [Nigeria currency] (after Pilaszewicz, 1995: 
30) 
Cultural and linguistic diversity in Nigeria allowed the British during colonialism 
to impose a policy of "divide and rule" that saved them significantly colonial expenses. 
Reinforced ethnic rivalries created alienation ad animosity among different ethnic groups 
(Badru, 1998: 70). 
Muhammadu Marwa was stating that his entire ideology came from the 
interpretation of the Koran. One has to know that next to the direct interpretations of the 
Koran, there were the secret meanings (badini) of each verse, words, or even individual 
letters, so the number of interpretations could be unlimited and each fragment of the 
Koran could have many different meanings (Hiskett, 1987: 218). Additionally, Maitatsine 
rejected the Sunna and the Hadiths that are the sayings of the prophet Mohammed. He 
stated that reading any other book than Koran is an offense to Islam (Kastflet, 1989: 83). 
Muhammadu Marwa also exchanged the name of the prophet Mohammed by his 
own name (what was not difficult, as they both had the same first name) and named 
himself the next prophet. As the prophet, he required from his disciples total obedience. 
12 Muhammadu Marwa did not leave any written sermons nor documents with his ideology, so the only 
sources that are available are those from newspapers and from the 'Yan Tatsine testimonies. 
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He claimed that his purpose was to cleanse the Islamic religion of materialism and to 
purify its religious practices (Okoli, 1982). However, in his practice, Maitatsine himself 
was using elements from the Mufu traditions, like: hypnosis, use of amulets, and herbs. 
As we argued earlier, fundamentalist religious movements, being revolutionary 
movements fight with their ideology against cultural dependency, against the Western 
culture industry. They are supposed to be social movements fighting for the liberation of 
the society from any ideological dependencies. However, as we mentioned already, one 
can observe at the Maitatsine example, fundamentalist religious movements were 
introducing and indoctrinating their followers into another form of hegemony, counter 
hegemony of Islamic fundamentalism. Before entering the movement of Maitatsine, his 
future disciples were internalizing the standards of Western culture present in the cities, 
trying to gain as much material consumer goods as possible. In the cities, lost migrants 
were forgetting about their traditions and culture, becoming a shell filled only with 
materialistic needs able only to consume and survive. They were becoming human shells 
filled with culture industry, a result of removal of the traditional culture and efforts to 
assimilate to the new environment of the city. Charismatic Muhammadu Marwa, thanks 
to the intelligent framing and mobilizing process captured, those who tried to live up to 
western standards in African reality but could not and were often left the only possibility 
to beg in order to survive. They were then indoctrinated and converted to new counter 
hegemony of Islamic fundamentalism with traditional elements (that is hypocritical from 
the very beginning). The entire process of the establishment of the new hegemony 
composed with three stages: universalization, rationalization, and naturalization 
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(Litowitz, 2000). were processed in Maitatsine movement. He managed to persuade his 
followers to the rightness and obviousness of his ideology. 
However, as it was mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, there exist no 
institution that could dictate the unique interpretation of Koran, so if somebody is 
persuasive enough, he can get acceptance like Maitatsine did, without any judicial or 
excommunicating consequences. 
The popularity of the Maitatsine religious movement decreased significantly after 
the last riots in 1985. One can still encounter some smaller disturbances in Nigeria where 
the 'Yan Tatsine are blamed. However, currently, there are larger and more significant 




My research will contribute to the level of knowledge that social science has about 
fundamentalist religious movements by developing a new theoretical approach that will 
exhaustively analyze the emergence and functioning of Islamic religious movements. 
This research is important because, especially nowadays one hears of anti-globalization 
protests arguing that the superpowers like United States (nowadays the only superpower 
in the world) cultivate and provoke the hatred it experiences from other nations (in 
present times, Islamic Nations), but nobody really explained what are the reasons of this 
phenomenon. My research might document the source of part of that hatred, and maybe 
the beginning for a dialogue based on understanding between the two sides. 
This knowledge could allow change of attitudes and thus maybe based on the 
theoretical approaches we could take action to decrease the amount of religious 
fundamentalist movements, not only Islamic ones, and to make us aware of the 
consequences of globalization. As Barber (1992) concluded the conflict between 
globalization and religious fundamentalism: "Neither McWorld nor Jihad is remotely 
democratic in impUlse. Neither needs democracy and neither promotes democracy." So, 
how fundamentalist religious movements emerge? What is the favorable environment for 
the emergence of this kind of movement, and how the "free world" of capitalist system 
influences those movements? The new theoretical approach presented in this thesis will 
be able to answer those questions. 
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Maitatsine movement emerged in a peripheral country during the oil boom and then 
bust of 1970s and then 1980s, when a lot of people migrated to cities believing the great 
opportunities from the time of oil boom still existed. However, the cities had already a 
high rate of unemployment and did not need a supplementary work force. Additionally, 
with growing economic disparities, most wealth was in hands of local elites cooperating 
with multinational corporations. The analysis of Maitatsine presented in this thesis 
showed that followers of the religious fundamentalist movements tend to be people that 
did not find their place in the dominant culture, which facilitated them seeing the 
injustice and "true face" of Western exploitation. In the case of Maitatsine, they were 
displaced, foreigners, unemployed, poor people that could not identify with the dominant 
ideology and they were captured by the religious leaders in the moment of insecurity, 
hesitation, and doubting that were easy to mobilize into religious movement. One of the 
social movement theorists, Edward Shils (quoted in Buechler and Cylke, 1956: 156), 
states that the extremists/fundamentalists must be deeply alienated from the complex of 
rules, which keep the strivings for various values in restraint and balance. We elaborated 
in this thesis that many followers of religious movements come from a lower class of the 
society (in many cases, from the lowest possible one)!. 
The analysis of the external factors showed that the position of a country in the 
international division of labor system with its economic and political consequences 
influence the emergence of religious fundamentalist movements. During economic crisis 
or war, when the future is uncertain and many people lose their jobs, the poverty rate is 
getting higher and the state is not able to provide social support to its society, 
fundamentalist religious movements occur. People start to look for explanations of their 
1 However, there exist orthodox movements that include mainly educated people from higher social classes 
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situation and start looking for the shelter and security religious movements provide 
(Isichei 1987; Hiskett 1987). This is the moment when people start to see the injustice 
and feel grievance, which is the first steps toward mobilizing a new social movement. 
While the state can prevent the emergence of new movements, we showed in this 
thesis that it would not do it. We showed the significance of the role of the state in the 
emergence of religious fundamentalist movement. As these movements tend to emerge in 
countries where states are weak and involved in the triple alliance with the multinational 
corporations and newly emerged bourgeoisie, and as such they are not interested much in 
the prosperity of its population. This fact gives fundamentalist movements one more 
advantages as they provide the social support that the state fails to provide. 
Thus religious ideology, combined with hard economic conditions, chaos in 
religious administration, (the conflict between brotherhoods), and invasion of foreign, 
Western culture resulted in the emergence of a powerful fundamentalist religious 
movement against the ruling elites and the domination of the West. This picture pointed 
out the conflict between the hegemony of the culture industry and the emergence of the 
counter hegemony of the Maitatsine's Islamic fundamentalism. Thanks to the 
understanding of external influences, we managed to see what made people be 
dissatisfied enough to join a very structured religious movement. 
As people are affected by external factors, there is a need for a leader with an 
ideology to lead them and unify them. Here, we showed the use of social movement 
theories where David Snow and Robert Benford (1988, 1992) pointed out the necessity 
f()f frames that have to grant "diagnostic," "prognostic," and " motivational" functions. In 
case of Maitatsine, Muhammadu Marwa pointed out the problem of Nigerian society 
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related to western domination, showed solving this problem by rejecting any elements of 
western culture, and following the norms and values of Islam. Finally, as religion offers 
both organizational and cultural resources to facilitate mobilization and helps achieve at 
least some success (Smith, 1996; Williams 1994), Islam served also a motivational 
function2• Also, as the agency and identity of the religious movement were closely related 
to religious ideology of the religious leader, with three components of mobilization and 
framing satisfied (feeling of injustice, agency, and identity) it was very easy for 
Muhammadu Marwa to create a strong religious movement and to lead his followers 
wherever he wanted to what led to catastrophic consequences. However, as we saw, 
social movement theories were not able to analyze the change that fundamentalist 
religious movements' disciples, as Maitatsine' s ones, had to undertake switching from 
western culture hegemony to religious ideology. This is where we saw the need to 
introduce the Antonio Gramsci's concept of counter hegemony (Gramsci, 2000). The 
three necessary functions of social movements, diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational 
ones were perceived in our analysis as part of the establishment by the movement's 
leader of the counter hegemony. 
From the analysis of the Maitatsine movement, one could observe that the counter 
hegemony does not have any chances to succeed if the original hegemonic system 
provides some kinds of satisfaction to the individuals. If the individuals have at least 
some satisfaction with the current hegemonic system, they will not be willing to make 
2 The success of Islam in African societies is related to several factors. It is an entire system that 
reintegrates individuals tom away from their roots. It is related to the feeling of superiority over other 
social groups and feeling of brotherhood among Muslims, and finally, it suggests new beliefs, norms, and 
values without the need to reject the old ones - in contrary to Christianity (Pilaszewicz, 2000: 239). 
Additionally, as it does not have any unique valid rules and norms, it can be adjusted along the ideology of 
the charismatic religious leader. 
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any efforts in order to make a change. This is why in order for a social movement to 
emerge some degree of grievance is necessary. Disciples of Maitatsine were believing 
and living under the culture industry hegemony, as they moved from their home towns, 
forced by the hard economic conditions caused by the dynamics in the world system, in 
order to encounter a better life that culture industry was supposed to provide. However, 
when they did not succeed, dissatisfaction emerged and they became easy souls to the 
counter hegemony of Islamic fundamentalism represented by Maitatsine. 
Toyin FaIola (1998) states that: 
Islamic preachers and teachers present Islam as a coherent worldview that protects 
its followers from moral decadency, corrosion brought by industrialization, and 
political errors. Islam continues to spread, making most of the mass media to reach 
old and new members (FaIola, 1998: 31). 
However, what form will these teachings take? Will the Islamic organizations 
liberal, orthodox, or fundamentalist? Unfortunately, nobody knows the answer to that 
question. However, hopefully, this case study will create a fundament for a wider 
understanding of the emergence and popularity of Islamic, Christian, and other 
fundamentalisms in the world. 
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